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How Do You Know You’re Not Lost?

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In high school I said I didn’t know where I was, and a kid asked me how a person could not know that.

So I asked him where he was.

Monadnock High School. Where’s that? Swanzey. Where’s that? New Hampshire. Where’s that? America. Where’s that? Earth. Where’s that? The solar system. Where’s that? The Milky Way. Where’s that? The universe.

Where’s that?

He looked at me like I had asked something indecent, and then he stopped, and stood there.

I want to be careful about what happened in that hallway, because it is the whole of what follows. I did not trap him. He supplied every term himself, confidently, and the confidence is what carried him up the ladder. Each answer he gave was a where answered by a within — he said where he was by naming the thing he was inside of, and then the thing that thing was inside of, and so on, and the series ran out of insides while the form of the question kept right on going. That is not a failure of his education. It is what the question does when you follow it honestly. The last address has no address.

Then I asked him a different question and gave it to him as homework: how do you know you’re not lost?

I want to hold that question for a while, because I have been carrying it for a long time, and because everything I know about logic turns out to be a comment on it.

Is p the same as the universe?

Here is the version I ask now, when there is no one in the hallway.

What is the difference between calling the universe p and calling the universe the universe?

Most people say there is none. It is just a name, a letter standing in for a thing, the way algebra has always used letters. And I agree with them. I think p and the universe are the same, and for the same reason: both are terms that can contain anything.

That agreement is not the end of the conversation. It is the trap closing.

Because when a person says the universe, they believe they are handling something they know a little about — the largest thing, the one with stars in it, the one they were looking up at. And when they see p, they believe they have been handed a piece of abstract machinery with no content at all. If those two are the same gesture, then the word people say while looking up is a blank they mistook for a possession. They did not have to be argued out of their knowledge. The knowledge was a placeholder from the start, and they conceded it in the first ten seconds, to be agreeable.

Before I lean on that, I want to show the machinery doing honest work, because it does, and because the dishonest case is borrowed from the honest one. I am going to change letters to do it. Not p but x, and not because the difference is a technicality I am tidying up — the difference is the whole finding, and I will come back to it once the machinery is in view.

Take Boole’s algebra of classes. Write 1 for the class of everything under discussion and x for some class inside it — the apples on the table, say. Then 1 − x is the class of the non-apples: everything in 1 that is not an apple. Take the complement twice and you have the apples back, exactly, with nothing lost and nothing smuggled. The complement is a real class because the 1 was fixed first, and fixed small. The table. The crate. Whatever the discussion was about.

That fixing has a name. The model theorists — the people whose whole business is the relation between symbols and what they are about — call the domain a term ranges over the universe of discourse. That is their term, not mine. They use it without blinking, and what they mean by it is the crate: the thing agreed on before the algebra starts.

So a term does range over a universe, and a universe is what terms range over. Two ordinary words, one from the blackboard and one from the night sky, and they will not stay out of each other. The only question left is what got put in the crate.

And people will put anything in it. A letter is a slot, and a slot takes whatever you hand it, and if what you hand it is the universe then x = 1 and the algebra accepts it without a word of complaint. That is the move. It is free, and nobody stops you.

Bertrand Russell spent a good part of his life outlawing exactly that shape. We will come back to him.

The moon is not an apple

Nobody has ever needed to say so.

Not an apple has never meant complementation in anyone’s mouth. Ordinary negation runs against a contrast class — the pear you expected, the wax one, the thing you thought you were biting. The domain is always small, always local, and always set by the situation rather than by the total. When someone says it isn’t an apple, you know without asking what small crate they are working in, and the moon is not in it.

Now hand the slot the universe and run the same operation.

If x = 1, the complement is 0, the empty class. Complement again and you are at 1. Anyone trained will answer in one line: the negation of the top is the bottom, the negation of the bottom is the top, so the double negation is the thing you started with, trivially, next question. And that is correct. I want to agree with it quickly, because the triviality is the interesting part.

You were promised a journey. Out of the universe, and back. And the machinery returns you before you have moved at all. Nothing was traversed. There was no road, no exit, no return — only a piece of bookkeeping about a domain, performed instantly, because the domain was fixed before you arrived.

Fixed by whom?

That is the question the algebra cannot answer about itself, and it is the one I would like the trained reader to sit with after they have said trivially. Classical negation is complementation inside a domain. Which domain? The total one, always, by stipulation. And the stipulation has a date on it.

It did not have to be this way. Aristotle saw term negation and named it — not-man, the indefinite name, De Interpretatione chapter two — and set it aside. Traditional logic went on using it anyway; obversion runs on term complements, and so does most of the square. The algebra I just ran is term negation outright. It is Frege who makes negation sentence-scoped, and Frege was honest that he was not modeling language. He was building an instrument for arithmetic. The complaint does not land on him. It lands on everyone who took the instrument and resold it as a theory of reasoning.

It also explains why a reader today hears ~p — an operator on a sentence — at the exact moment the argument needs the complement of a class. That hearing is not a mistake the reader made. It was installed.

So the apple and the universe are one question approached from two ends. What domain does the complement take, and who set it?

Russell answered by prohibition: in 1908, after the paradox, nothing that involves all of a collection may be a member of that collection. He wrote that rule in order to make the question unaskable, and he wrote it after being asked it. Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory blocks the universal set too, though Quine’s New Foundations keeps it, and there the complement of the universe is simply the empty set and nobody is harmed. Which means whether you are permitted to ask depends on which axioms you joined. It was never a fact about the universe. Somebody legislated, and the legislation got taught as a finding.

The permission is free. The consequences are not. The move the kid made in the hallway — and what is that inside of — is exactly the move that broke Frege. Russell’s letter of 1902 is one page and it does nothing but perform that inclusion. Frege was entirely allowed to ask. It cost him the Grundgesetze, and he said so in the appendix, and I have never read a more honest paragraph by a mathematician.

And beyond

Here is where I think the damage is, and I want to be exact about it, because the target is not mathematics.

When we say the full reach of what we know, and beyond, the word and turns the beyond into one more item on the inside of a list. It arrives as a gesture toward what exceeds the inventory and it leaves as the inventory’s last entry. One of my professors wrote a book called To Infinity and Beyond, and the phrase is now a children’s catchphrase, and both of those facts are the same fact: the outside has been annexed, cheerfully, by a conjunction.

The term is empty. It names nothing, describes nothing. But held as a term it functions as coverage, and coverage is enough to stop the looking. Nobody has to actually know anything. They only have to believe the accounting is closed.

Mathematics is the emblem here, not the culprit. Mathematics is the one subject where closure is real — proofs do close, inside their domains, and that is its genuine glory. Most mathematicians know their subject is small. The harm is done by the things that borrow the prestige: a filter that sells closure as such, using the one discipline that can honestly claim it in order to make the claim on behalf of everything else. It is the self-importance, not the mathematics.

And a syllabus is a universe of discourse that has forgotten it is one.

That is the whole of my objection to what is done to people in school, and it is not an adjacent grievance. It is the same finding at civic scale. A test can only ask about the inside of a fixed domain — that is not a flaw in testing, that is what testing is. What a test certifies is agreement with a boundary, and for the certificate to mean anything the boundary has to be presented as the edge of what is known rather than as somebody’s choice. Wonder is therefore off-syllabus by construction. It has no answer key, so it cannot be graded, so it cannot be required, so it drifts out of the account entirely. Nobody decided this. It follows from the shape.

And so we spend the years. Everyone must pass through algebra, and almost nobody uses it, and the ones who are lost by it are lost for good, and the ones who pass are certified as possessing a body of what-is-known that was a stipulation with a date on it.

Does this threaten our survival? Attention to the beyond is metabolism long before it is philosophy. For anything with an inside and an outside, the edge of the known is where the food comes from and where the thing that eats you comes from. What stops asking stops eating.

But I doubt it ever will. The word keeps failing. The sphere of the fixed stars was everything, and then it wasn’t. The Milky Way was everything until the 1920s. Each time, universe was believed to do what it says it does, and each time something got out — always by way of somebody who did not credit the account. So what I am describing is a tax, not an ending. It is enormous, and we pay it every year, in children.

1999

In 1999 I read something on the Dalai Lama’s website about continuity — the idea that the continuity of the mathematicians is a symbolic deadening of all living, animate beings. I went looking for it the next year and the page was gone. I do not have the wording. I am not sure the Dalai Lama wrote it; it may have been commentary on the site. My impression, for whatever a twenty-seven-year-old impression is worth, is that he went the other way: that the mathematical definition of continuity was the more developed one, more so than the old Buddhist formulation.

Which would mean that what I have been doing all this time did not begin as an inheritance. It began as an objection. A teenager watched a religious authority hand the concept over to the mathematicians, and did not accept the handover.

I have looked for the page since. It is not there. Twenty-seven years, and the wording is gone, and the idea is still running everything I write. I think that is the correct form for it to have survived in.

Home

I saw the kid again several years later. I had come to the school to pick up my brother, and he was standing next to him, and he looked at me and said: you’re not lost when you know where your home is.

That was my answer, the one I gave him as homework and then gave him back the next time I saw him, and he had kept it the whole time.

I spared him home is where the heart is. He did not need it, and it would have made the thing corny, and it is not corny. It is formal. 

Containment is not the error. The crate on the table was a real containment and the truthful account of what was on it. The error is containment claimed past the last outside — the box with nothing to be a box inside of, which is not a larger box but a word wearing the shape of one.

Location by containment fails. The addresses run out; the last one has no address; the ladder is made of names and it ends in the air. Location by relation does not fail. Home is not a larger box that the universe sits inside. It is a point you can orient toward from anywhere, and it requires no totality at all.

So the not-lost I offered him is not a consolation prize for the knowledge we cannot have. It is a different kind of knowing, and it happens to be the kind that works.

Ask a person what the difference is between p and the universe. When they tell you there is none, they have just agreed that the universe is a variable. Everything after that is only watching what they were already willing to say.

And then ask them the other one.

companion piece: https://questionsarepower.org/2026/08/06/%e5%ae%88/

Home


You are a part of my home
We bond sometimes when I find you.
This life, you were on the edge the universe
I walk to you, so I can be with a piece of my home
Then I have to leave
Because my home broke
My home grew and shrank
It changed forms
I see a piece of my home in that cloud
I try to be there, drifting, changing
Until my home is not there anymore
And I must walk to find another piece
I do this drifting
To keep my heart whole
My heart is mended, as long as I walk
in search of a glimmer that was part of my home

Wander and Axiom

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a theogony

I. That Has Been Established

Before there was anything to be true about, Axiom was already the case.

He was not the strongest of the first powers and never needed to be. Strength contends; Axiom did not contend. He held. And he had one habit that everything else about him grew out of, which was this: he did not look at things. He established them. He would arrive at a place, consider what must be so, declare it so, and move on. The place would obey, and he would never afterward have any reason to go back and check. Looking is for those who might be wrong.

When Flow was brought to him he established that she was his wife, and she was.

She was not unhappy about it at first. He was the one who held. There is a kind of girl who finds that restful, which she had been for about a century, and she liked walking beside him while he settled the shape of things, and she liked that nothing could go wrong in a place he had been.

When she was with child he established that the child would be his, and it was.

Then Ground, who was older than all of them and spoke perhaps twice an age, said to him in a voice like a house settling at night:

One of these will overturn you.

Axiom considered this for a long time. He had never been given a sentence he could not place. It did not follow from anything. It sat in him like a splinter under the nail, and because he could not remove it he did the only thing he knew how to do with a possibility.

He ate it.

The first was Hearth, the still center, who was three days old. Flow brought her out into the light and Axiom put out his hands without turning his head, because he was in the middle of establishing something, and took the bundle, and swallowed. Flow made a sound. He said, kindly, without pausing, That has been established, and went on with what he had been saying.

Then Seed, who was the not-yet. Then Air, the between. Then Water, the taking-of-shape. Then Space, the room in which anything at all could be somewhere else.

There were four more.

She did not leave. She was not kept and she was not deceived; she knew after the first one exactly what he was and exactly what would happen, and she lay down with him again, and carried, and bore, and brought the child out into the light with her own arms, four more times. She could not afterward explain this to anybody, including herself. The nearest she ever came was to say that each time she had thought — not hoped, thought, in the flat way you think a thing you have decided is true — that this one he might look at.

And once she hid one. Water, it was. She kept her a day and a half in a fold of the hills, and then walked out and gave her over herself, on her own legs, unasked. The hiding had turned out to be worse than the giving. She stopped being asked about it long before she stopped thinking about it.

They did not die. Nothing dies in Axiom. Inside him they stopped being children and became premises — fixed, and true in the particular way a thing is true when no one is permitted to ask about it again. Hearth felt herself going stiff and had time to think one clear thought before the stiffness took her, and the thought was: I will keep one coal.

II. The Stone

Flow went down under the world to Ground, and stayed there a long while, and came back up with a stone in her apron.

It was an ordinary grey stone about the size of a loaf. That was the entire trick, and she understood exactly why it would work, and understanding it was the worst hour of her life.

Ground had a great many stones. Flow was down there long enough to have looked at most of them, and what she came up with was the ugliest thing in the place — pocked, mean, slightly the wrong shape, a stone you would not want in your house. She chose it for that reason. She knew, while she was choosing it, precisely what kind of reason that was, and she took it anyway, and she has never pretended otherwise.

She bore the sixth in a cave and did not let herself hold him long. Then she wrapped the stone in the birth-cloth, still warm, and practised.

She said Here perhaps forty times, sitting on the floor of the cave with the bundle in her lap, in different ways, until it came out of her flat and slightly bored, the voice of a woman handing over a thing of no importance. Then she walked out to where her husband was establishing the boundaries of the year.

“Here,” she said.

He put out his hands. He did not turn his head. And she stood there with the bundle in her arms and let herself see it plainly at last — that he was not going to look, that he had never looked, not once, not at any of them; that he had swallowed five children and could not have described a single one of their faces, nor said which had her eyes, nor told you whether Water had been a boy.

She gave him the stone.

She heard it go down.

“Thank you,” said Axiom, pleasantly, to the air beside her, and went back to the year.

And she wanted to laugh.

Not the grief, which she had budgeted for; the laugh that came up behind it, immediate and delighted and vicious, the laugh of someone who has just got away with something in a house where nothing has ever been got away with. She held it in. She held it in for an age. It is in her still, on certain nights getting as far as her throat, and she is by now an old woman with five grown children and a dead husband who has still never once let it out where anyone could hear.

III. The Mountain

The mountain was one he had not yet ruled upon. He had ruled on nearly everything by then, but not that hill, and a thing unruled is a thing unwatched.

Wild women kept the child there. When he cried they beat their shields with the flats of their spears, so that the noise went up and out into the sky and could not be traced back down to anything.

He worked out at four that this was a thing he could cause.

He was not in distress on most of those occasions. He simply liked the noise. He liked that it went up and out and came down somewhere else and belonged to nobody. Lying on his back in the middle of a racket with no author was the first pleasure of his life, and he arranged for it perhaps twice a week for two years. The women knew quite well what he was doing and beat the shields anyway, because they were fond of him and because it was funny.

They gave him no throne-name and no office. They called him Wander, because there was nowhere he was supposed to be. He was not in the account.

Flow came when she could. She could not come often.

There were times she could have come and did not. The mountain was a long way. The road went up through country her husband had established early and never afterward revisited — a river running where it had been told to run, a stand of trees that had not since put out anything unaccounted for — and she walked it at night mostly, past a flat stone near the top that she had sat down on the first time and every time after, which was a good deal harder to get up off going one way than going the other. She was tired. There is a specific exhaustion in visiting a child you are not allowed to keep, and some seasons she looked at the road and did not take it, and told him afterward that it had been the distance. He knew it was not the distance. He had got good early at knowing what people were not saying. He never mentioned it, never held it against her, put it somewhere and kept it.

He was perhaps six when he asked her the question every child asks, and she told him the truth, because she had already decided that this one was going to be told things.

“Are they dead?”

“No,” said Flow. “That’s the worst of it. They’re in there. They’re alive, and they’ve been made to hold still.”

He thought about that for a while, the way children do, without hurrying.

“Then I’ll go and get them,” he said.

His mother put her hand over her mouth. She had come up the mountain that night to tell him to hide, to stay small, to live — and she found she could not say any of it, because she had waited an age for someone in her family to say a thing like that out loud.

He meant it entirely.

He also noticed, in the middle of saying it, that it was a tremendous thing to say, and that his mother’s face had changed while he said it, and he had a small private moment of admiring how it had sounded coming out of him. Both of those were the case at the same time. They went on being the case at the same time for the rest of his life.

And nobody told him not to.

He was six years old and he undertook to go inside a god and bring five people out, and there was no one in existence whose office it was to say no you will not. So the sentence was said on a hillside by a small boy, and it stood, and from that night on everyone who knew he existed treated him as the one who was going to do it.

“He’ll see you coming,” she said, when she could speak. “He sees everything that follows from what he’s laid down.”

“Then I’ll come from somewhere else.”

“There isn’t anywhere else, love.”

“There’s this hill,” said Wander.

IV. The Three Learnings

He learned three things, and learned all of them from the world rather than from a father, which is why Axiom never knew he had them.

Thunder he learned from the shields, and he had half of it before he could speak. He understood that a sound can arrive long after the thing that made it, so that anyone who hears it and reasons backward will reason into an empty place. Thunder is an effect that has slipped its cause.

He spent a year using it on the women who had raised him. Honey, mostly. Bread. A blanket he did not need. One knife.

The knife was missed, and a girl was blamed for it — one of the young ones, newly come up, who had no history there to defend her. He was in the room while they said it. He was eleven. He did not speak. He had a reason at the time, but it was gone by the following spring and never turned up again.

He waited to be caught. He took a comb in February and a second blanket in March, and waited to be caught for those too. Being found out was the only way the weight could ever be taken off him, and he waited the rest of that winter. Nobody came. Nobody came because nobody could: the shields had done their work, the noise of the theft had arrived from the far side of the hill, and he was the only person on that mountain who knew what had happened.

So he put it down somewhere in himself instead, the way you put down a thing you intend to come back for, and he never came back for it, and he carries it still.

Lightning he learned from a storm that opened a tree above him and left it standing in two halves, smoking. He saw that the bolt does not choose its road. It goes down every road at once, groping, branching, a hundred crooked arms in the dark, and only afterward is one arm remembered as the path while the rest are forgotten as though never attempted. From Lightning he took the sight of the many futures: he could stand in a moment and see all of its arms at once, lit and reaching.

He used it, for a long time, on nothing whatsoever. Which hand the pebble was in. Which way the hare would break. Which of the women would lose her temper first, and how to be standing somewhere else when she did. He was very good at games that year, and unbearable about it. He could have seen which of them had lied about the stores, and which two were not speaking and why, and he never once looked; there was no sport in it, and the hare was better. And the eldest took him aside to tell him that a man who always wins is a man nobody plays with, which he thought about for a week, then went on winning. He liked the little astonishment on people’s faces when he told them which way the hare would run, and sometimes waited half a second before telling them, to make sure they had time to be astonished. That was the last time anyone ever corrected him about anything.

Bright was last and nearly killed him.

Bright is what you look through. Nobody has ever seen brightness; they have only seen what it fell on. To learn it he had to stop being a thing that light falls on and become the falling.

The wild women told him what it would cost. They were not gentle about it; they were fond of him.

“If you do this,” said the eldest, “he will never find you. And nothing else will ever find you either. You will be looked through for the rest of your life. No one will ever meet your eyes again, not your mother, not your sisters, not one of them, not ever.”

Wander was young and had lived his whole life on a hill where nobody was allowed to say his father’s name.

“Will I be able to reach them?”

“Yes.”

“Then it’s cheap,” he said, and he was wrong about the price, not about the trade.

He stepped into it. And afterward he was still there — you could see him, you could answer him — but no eye would hold him, and no face turned the whole way toward him, and nothing that met him could afterward say it had.

His father was a separate matter. Axiom’s great sight covered all that followed from all he had laid down, and it went over him and found nothing, because Wander now followed from nothing at all, and a thing that follows from nothing is a thing that cannot be thought.

And then he ran wild.

He was nine years old, he had just become the one thing in existence that nobody could take hold of, and no hand could ever come down on his shoulder again. He went everywhere. He stood at the elbows of kings in halls he had no business in. He listened to people who believed themselves alone. He took food off tables in front of the people whose food it was, and the servants were beaten for it. Once he stood an entire evening in a room where a woman was bathing — not touching anything, not doing anything, simply there, unmeetable — and he came out of it shaken, and went back twice. The second time she looked up, at nothing, and covered herself, and sat very still until the water went cold.

He did not go back.

He could not be caught. Not by his father, and not by anyone else. Nobody could pull him out by the ear, call him by his name, and make him give the thing back in front of someone who loved him. He could only carry it, because carrying was the one skill anyone had ever required of him.

And his brothers and sisters were in the dark the entire time.

He knew where they were. He had known since he was six. It is not the case that he spent those years preparing; he spent some of those years preparing. The rest of them he spent being the only free thing there was, in a world where five of his family had been made to hold still, and the distance between those two facts is not something he was ever in any hurry to stand close to.

He had also, by then, been the one who was going to do it for longer than most people are anything, and was tired in a way he had no word for and no one to describe it to. A tired child will put a thing off for an age and call it timing.

Once or twice across the ages Axiom noticed that his accounting failed to balance. There was a remainder. He considered it, and corrected the accounting, and never for an instant doubted the ledger instead of the sum. His blindness was not inflicted on him by anyone. He performed it himself, carefully, like a rite.

V. The Waking

The poets will tell you there was a war, and there was: ten years of it, Titans and thrown mountains, Toil and Weight and Hour and Edge and End, and it was magnificently loud and it was entirely a decoy. Wander gave them a war to watch because he needed everyone facing outward for a long time. 

He was in it himself, occasionally, in the only way left to him. The noise over that field was his. It came down out of a clear sky and from the wrong direction and could not be traced back to anything, and the Titan line broke where he had known since morning it would break, because he had stood in the moment and seen every arm of it and put himself at the root of the one he wanted. They said afterward that the sky had been with them, and later still that he had gone through that army with the lightning in his fist, which is a good picture and never happened. And every day he was the weather over that war was a day there was nobody in the dark.

People died in it. He walked the field afterward, unseen, the length of it and back, and nobody knew he was there, and he did not tell anyone he had gone.

The real work was inside his father, and it was not a battle. It was a rescue, and it went slowly, and it nearly failed four times.

He went in unseen and found the dark, and in the dark five enormous held-still things, set into place like stones in a wall. He put his hand on the nearest and said, quietly, the only thing he had:

“Air. Wake up.”

Nothing.

“Air. It’s me. I’m the sixth. He never got me.”

Nothing. She had been a premise for an age.

So he tried something else. He asked her a question — not about herself, a stupid one, an idle one, the kind a child asks. Why is the dark this colour and not another?

And in the wall, something moved.

Because a question is a thing with an open end, and an open end cannot be a premise, and Air had been the between, and the between is exactly where questions live. Her first sound in an age was not a word. It was the upward hook at the end of a sentence. It came up out of her like breath out of someone pulled from a river.

…why?

Axiom, far above them, stopped mid-establishment and stood very still, because for the first time in his existence he contained something he could not answer out of himself. He answered it anyway. He was thorough. Yet an answer has to be defended, and defending concedes that there was something to defend against, and so a draught went under a door somewhere inside him that he could not find.

“Say your name,” Wander said to his sister.

“I don’t have a name. I have a definition.”

“Say the definition, then.”

“The between.”

“Good,” said Wander. “Now be it.”

She was. That was the whole of the war, in the end, and it looked nothing like a war.

Her second question was her own, and it was not a kind one, and she asked it the moment she had breath for it.

How long have you been out there?

He said something. She did not pursue it. She was the between and she could hear an answer arriving from the wrong direction, and she let it go past her, and letting it go past was considerably worse than pursuing it would have been, and she knew that too.

VI. The Others

Water would not wake for a question, so Wander sat in the dark beside her for what he later learned was eleven years and told her things. What the sea does at the turn of the tide. How a puddle holds a whole sky in it upside down and does not spill. What his mother’s face looked like from underneath, when she bent over you.

He told her about rain on different things, because rain on a roof, rain on a pond, rain on your own bare arm are three separate pieces of information, all three of which he had; he told her some of it twice, knowing while he did it that he was doing it, going on anyway, because there was nothing down there to mark where one telling stopped and the next started, for the alternative was to sit in the dark beside his sister and say nothing.

Water woke because she wanted to see.

What she wanted to see first she did not admit to anybody for an age: it was herself. She had been told about the sea and the sky and the puddle, and what she came up out of the dark wanting, with a force that frightened her, was to find out what she looked like. The first thing she did was hold up a surface with her own face in it, which she looked at for a good long while — turning it, holding it further off, pleased and appalled and pleased again — and it was very nearly an accident that Axiom’s face went into it at all.

Yet it did. And it was very nearly right — very nearly — and he lurched, because an image is a second copy, and whatever can be copied is a thing that happens to be, and a thing that happens to be might have been otherwise. He had never once been an example of himself.

Space woke fastest, was the most dangerous, and enjoyed himself enormously.

All Space had to do was stop being compressed. He opened. And then, having opened, he went on opening — stretched, took more room than he needed, put an elbow where an elbow could not be, spread out with a great deal of unnecessary comment about how good it felt. A distance appeared between Axiom and the things Axiom contained — a gap where none was permitted — and from that hour Axiom was a being with an inside that was not him.

Seed was hardest. Seed was the not-yet, and Axiom had fixed her hardest of all, because not-yet was the enemy of everything he was. Twice Wander got her partly loose and felt his father’s attention come down on her like a hand on a bird, restating her, that has been established, that has been established, and she went stiff again both times, and the second time Wander put his head against the dark and wept.

On the third attempt he did not try to wake her. He planted something instead. Nothing much: one small fact that was true, and unfinished. And Axiom, who could not leave anything unresolved, resolved it — and the resolving made it grow, and the growing was Seed, and by the time he understood what he was feeding it had roots in him.

She has a habit now that she has never lost and will not be talked out of: she leaves things one step short of finished, on purpose, in other people’s houses. A shelf with the last peg out. A story with the end withheld. Ask her why and she will look at you pleasantly and not tell you, and you will find yourself thinking about it a week later, which is the point, and she knows it is the point.

Hearth was not asleep.

Hearth had been in there longest and had never quite gone under. When Wander finally found her, right down at the bottom, she had one coal, and it was still lit, and it had been lit for an age.

She had kept it by a method she was never afterward willing to describe, except once, to Water, in a kitchen, a long time later, when she said that it had mostly been a matter of going over small things — the order you bank a fire in, the number of steps across a room she had never stood in and had only been told about — that the trick was to choose things with no end to them, and that she had run out of things with no end to them about halfway through.

“I know,” she said, before he could speak. “I’ve been listening to you. You talk a great deal for someone who isn’t there.”

“How long has it been?” he said.

“Eleven years with Water. Longer than that with Seed. I couldn’t tell you what came before those, because before those you weren’t here.”

He did not answer.

“I’m not scolding you,” said Hearth. “I could hear you the whole time. You were having a lovely time out there. For the first age or so I was glad. Somebody in this family ought to have been.”

That was a great deal worse than scolding.

“You could have gone out.”

“Yes,” said his eldest sister. “I kept thinking someone might come.”

VII. Which One Am I In

After that it went quickly, and it was unbearable for all of them, because to wake the five was to fill their father with contradiction and their father was also the room they were standing in.

He began to feel it. Not pain; he had no arrangement for pain. What came over him has a name now only because he invented the name while it was happening to him. He no longer matched himself. He was a rule with exceptions living inside it, a sentence whose words had begun to move while he was still saying it. He would establish a thing and find that establishing it produced two futures instead of one, and he could not stop reasoning, because reasoning was the stuff he was made of. Once he reached for a boundary and found his hand already on the other side of it, and once he answered Flow, he heard his own voice speaking to the air beside her. Every correction bred a fork. Every fork bred two more.

And Wander, unseen, watching every arm of the lightning at once, chose where to stand.

The last of it was arranged over an age and lasted a heartbeat. He set his five siblings — free now, themselves now, doing nothing but existing in their own right — into a position with two continuations. Both complete. Both valid. Neither able to rule out the other.

Axiom examined it. Axiom examined it again.

And then, for the first time in the history of anything, Axiom asked a question.

Which one am I in?

VIII. Look At Me

He convulsed.

Nobody struck him. There was no draught and no second trick of Flow’s; those came later. He was trying to expel a contradiction, and it had gone too deep, and he did what a body does when it cannot hold what it holds.

(Flow heard that version eventually, the one with the potion in it, and she never corrected it, not once, not in an age. She liked being in it. She had done the actual thing, which was invisible, and the poets had handed her a cup, which was not, and she looked the exchange over and found she could live with it very comfortably.)

Up came the stone first — that plain grey stone, still agreeing with everything.

Up came Space, and the world had room in it. Up came Water, and Seed, and Air. Up came Hearth with her coal, the first in and the last out, and she stood in the open air blinking, an age old and three days old. Flow came down the sky like something falling and got all five of them into her arms at once, which should not have been possible and was. She did not say any of their names, for she had said all five to herself on so many nights, in so many empty rooms, that saying them now — out loud, in daylight, to faces — would have been a different act entirely, and she was not ready for it.

There was a sixth, and he stood where he was.

She spoke to him that evening and he answered her, and it was as it had been since he was nine: her eyes went past him on the way to something else, and neither of them remarked on it, because they had stopped remarking on it an age ago.

And Axiom came apart. He was bringing up every premise he had ever assumed, including the one he had never bothered to state, which was that he was; and he was turning inside out, and he was, at last, uncertain — and an uncertain Axiom is not a wounded Axiom. It is simply not Axiom.

Wander walked out into the middle of it. There was no reason to. The work was done and his siblings were behind him and the whole of the plan was complete. He walked out anyway, because he was nine years old on a hill once and had never met his father.

“Your son,” said Wander.

It did not arrive. Not because the air failed — the air was perfectly good, and every other thing in the world could hear him — but because Axiom had established what his children were and how many, and a sixth was not a thought available to him, and a thing that cannot be thought cannot be heard saying anything.

And Axiom turned his head.

He had never done it before. Not once, in the whole of existence — not at his wife, not at any of the six, not at the world he had established down to its last boundary. And now he turned his head, and he was looking for his son, and he wanted to find him; and he was searching a place where nothing could be seen, because his son had made himself into the very thing you look through, in order to come and get him. Flow turned her face away.

“Please look at me,” said Wander.

“I am looking,” said Axiom.

He went on looking for a while. Then the looking stopped being done by anybody. Nobody killed Axiom. He simply ceased to follow, and the world went on without requiring him, and after a time it had gone on so long that he was no longer the case, which is the only death available to something like him.

IX. The Bowing

The five stood in the light, wet and enormous and new, and looked around for whoever had done this, and found him. Half-found him. Their eyes came to where he was and slid, and came back.

He took a step sideways. Five faces turned, a little late, and lost him again, and found him again.

And they bowed.

Hearth was the last up off her knees. She came over with the coal still in her hand — the one she had kept lit an age, down at the bottom, by going over the order you bank a fire in — and gave it to him, and closed his fingers round it.

“You’ll want that,” she said. “It’ll be cold by evening, and there’s five of us, and nowhere to put anybody.”

She had been out of the dark less than an hour.

That was the trap. Nobody set it. It was made out of gratitude.

And it was lovely.

He had been unmeetable for an age. Nobody had looked at him since he was a boy on a hill, and now here were five faces turned up at him, every one belonging to somebody he had carried out of the dark, and it went into him like heat into a man who has stopped noticing he is cold. He answered it. Anyone would have answered it. Yet he was quick.

A bow makes a top. A top makes an order. An order is a rule, and to be the rule is to stand inside it, in the one place where a rule is most completely a prisoner. The instant Wander answered to the bowing, he had somewhere he was supposed to be.

And Wander was the name of one who did not.

He felt it go out of him like warmth out of a stone at nightfall. He kept Thunder — the noise of it, the weapon, the spectacle. He kept Lightning in his fist and Bright across his shoulders like a mantle. He kept all the tools and lost every single thing they had meant. The thunder still cracked; it no longer came from nowhere. The bolt still forked, and he could see only the arm that was actually taken. The brightness still fell on everything, and now everything could see him standing in it, which was, he found, about nine years too late.

The many futures came out of him entirely and went into the stone.

Of course they went into the stone. That stone had lain in the dark in his place once, pretending to be him so that he could go free. Now it lay in his hands holding everything he had been, and he was not free any more.

He held it a long time before he moved.

He thought about keeping it. He had the reason ready before he had finished having the thought — that it was dangerous, that it would have to be guarded, that of all of them he was the one it could be trusted with. And he heard the shape of that reason as it arrived.

He had been making decisions of that size since he was six, with nobody to check them against. Every single one had been approved by the only authority available, which was himself, and the approval had never once been withheld. A girl was blamed for a knife and it was approved. Servants were beaten for bread and it was approved. He stood in that woman’s room three times and it was approved, and he had gone on being, by every account including his own, the best thing that had ever happened to his family.

An age of that and he had learned exactly one thing about his own reasons, which was that the good ones and the others came to him in the same voice and arrived at the same speed.

Then he carried it a long way, to the middle of the earth, and set it down at Delphi, and did not keep it, and did not give it to his family, and did not set a guard on it.

Let nobody own this, he said. Let anyone ask.

It sits there still, full of all the roads at once. Any ruler may put a question to it, which it always answers, with every future it holds folded into a single sentence; and the ruler hears only the arm he was already walking down, and goes away satisfied, and is destroyed on schedule.

That was the last free act of his life, and he did it well.

X. The Doom

Then his sisters and his brothers looked at him, five faces he had spent an age reaching in the dark, all of them frightened now that it was over, with a world to run and nobody left who knew how — and he loved them, and so he sat down.

That is all it was. He did not seize it. He sat down to keep them safe, which is the best reason there has ever been, and it was the throne; once you are in it you must hold it, and holding is a thing he turned out to be very good at.

He was very good at it because he had been doing it since he was six. Nothing about the weight was new to him. All that was new was that the weight now had a chair under it and a name on it and everybody could see it, and the one moment in the whole of existence when he might have been allowed to set it down — the work finished, the five out, the sky open — was the moment it was formally handed to him.

Nobody comes to relieve the one who is managing. The five did not withhold it out of any unkindness; they simply looked at him doing it beautifully, year upon year, and drew the obvious conclusion, which is that it was not heavy.

The story counts his years while there is anyone counting. Six on the mountain. Nine on the night he bought Bright. Eleven in the room with the knife.

After that it is ages, and ages, and nobody has written down a number about him since.

He stopped wandering. He turned his gaze from the many roads to the single one, watched its horizon with enormous patience, and grew slowly better at ruling and slowly worse at everything else. Ages went by. He established a great deal.

He found, when he considered it, that he could not remember the names of the wild women. Hearth remembered two. He did not ask her for them. They had raised him in a hurry, for a purpose, knowing they could not keep him, and had let him go at nine because there was no one else to let him go, and he had left the hill and never gone back.

The girl who was blamed for the knife he had never learned the name of at all, not in the whole of the year he lived beside her, and that is the one he thinks about now: briefly, and then about something else.

And somewhere in that long unmoving season he heard Ground speaking in the old voice, like a house settling at night, saying the sentence she had said once before to somebody else:

One of these will overturn you.

He heard it as a warning.

It was not a warning.

They say he sits there yet, an excellent ruler, and that he has begun lately to answer his wife without turning his head.
Somewhere, a noise goes up and out into the sky, and there is no tracing it back down.

Get Lost

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A mathematics professor named Sam stands at a blackboard with an equation that will not come out. It has been not coming out for a long time. At the end of his patience he says what people say, that he would sell his soul to get the thing right, and a demon in sunglasses appears in the classroom to collect.

This is “I of Newton,” a short piece from the 1980s revival of The Twilight Zone, made from a story by Joe Haldeman, with Sherman Hemsley as the professor and Ron Glass as the demon.

Sam protests that he was only venting. Too late: what he said, it turns out, had exactly the right sound for an invocation. But a demon enjoys a contest, so terms are offered. Sam may ask three questions about the demon’s powers, and then he must set a question the demon cannot answer or a task the demon cannot perform. Sam says, “Really?” The demon informs him that he has just used his first question.

The second establishes that the demon can break the laws of physics and move through time as he pleases. The third: is there anywhere, in space or time or any other universe, from which the demon could not find his way back? Nowhere. The demon, enjoying himself now, tells Sam to go ahead. Sam says it is not a question but a command, and after a long pause gives it.

Get lost.

The demon vanishes with a howl. Sam drops the sunglasses in the bin and turns back to the blackboard, grumbling that the fellow wasn’t any help at all.

Before going further I want to separate two things that were present in that classroom, because everything after this turns on the difference.

There was a man looking for an answer.

And there was a being who had all of them.

Look at what happened to the first question. “Really?” is not a request for information. It is the sound a search makes while it is still searching — open, not yet aimed at anything, a man finding out where he is. The demon took it as a question spent and entered it in the account. That is the whole of what follows, told as a joke: the being who knows everything cannot hear a question except as a withdrawal.

Before the answer

To sense is to search. Looking for the slip in the third line. Waiting for the next step to show itself. Listening to find out whether that was the sound. The searching is not something done to a sensation that has already turned up; there is no arrival standing apart from the looking, waiting to be looked at. A measurement does not happen without the question that motivates it, and the question is not asked of the measurement afterwards — it is what put a man at the blackboard.

That is what I mean by questioning. Open, expanding, prior to any answer. Not a stance taken toward sensing but the shape sensing has.

Doubt is not the opposite of that. Doubt is its perversion. War is the perversion of peace, hate the perversion of love, despair the perversion of sadness — in none of these is the second the absence of the first. The second is made out of the first, with the same energy and the same motion, and what has been removed is the return. Sadness moves and passes; despair is sadness that will not move. Love reaches; hate is love that has fixed. Questioning opens; doubt is questioning that has closed and goes on asking anyway, which is why it cannot arrive and cannot stop.

The skeptics were named for the searching and not for the doubting. Zetesis: to go on looking. Sextus divides it three ways in his opening pages — the dogmatist says he has found it, the Academic says it cannot be found, and the skeptic is still searching. Only the middle one is doubt. It is the one that stopped and kept the motion anyway.

The classroom has all three positions in it, with one actor doubling. The demon has found everything, and on that strength he is certain that what Sam is looking for cannot be found. Dogmatist and Academic in one pair of sunglasses. Sam is the one still searching.

So doubt needs a claim to aim at, and the claim comes later. To doubt a sensation you must first have finished with it. You must have taken a number off it.

None of this makes the appearance certain, or sharp, or a floor to build on. Nothing is being received here that could be certain. The searching has no edges, because edges are what a formula brings, and it brings them afterwards.

The white in the middle

Vagueness is not a defect in the searching. It is the condition of anything appearing at all.

Shine red, green and blue light on a rough mirror. Then on a finer one. Then finer again. The finer the roughness, the more the three colours mix, and at the end of that progression you have a white surface. Every white thing in the world is a very finely rough mirror. Which means that if every difference had to stay a different appearance, no white thing could appear, and in the end no thing could. The white is not a coarse report of an underlying array of exact wavelengths. The white is what there is to see, and it is there because the differences are not being held apart.

Magnification does not undo this. Roughness is ordinarily what a microscope is for. But build the mirrors as a progression and the indistinctness persists at every magnification, so the move that is supposed to end vagueness runs forever without ending it.

This is the first thing the demon cannot see. Ask him the colour of the finest mirror and he will give you every wavelength leaving it, correctly, with the angle of each. He knows every difference and holds every one apart; that is what it is to know everything. So there is no white for him. White is only available to someone who does not know too much.

I built the box for a classroom and it turned out to be an argument. The children did not receive a verdict from it. They looked longer, and then looked again, and the look times ran long at exactly the mirrors where the theory would not apply. One of them said the colours were beautiful and she did not want to write them down. Another said he could not remember what he saw. What the roughness does is not deliver a false report. It keeps you looking.

Vagus: to wander. Vagueness is wandering, and the wandering is the searching that has not been told where to stop.

Get lost is vagus in the imperative.

No second kind

The felt body, emotion, the texture and arrival and duration of a thought. These are searched for the same way and found the same way. Looking for whether that was fear is the same act as looking for whether that was the sound. There is no inner theatre with a smaller observer seated in it, sunglasses or no, and no second kind of finding that would need a different licence.

The standing objection is that introspection is a bad instrument. People confabulate. People report reasons for their behaviour that demonstrably were not the reasons. People miss large changes and then deny that they missed them.

I concede all of it without reservation, because every one of those findings is about a number taken. Confabulation is a false report of a cause. Change blindness is a failed claim about persistence across a gap. Memory revision is a claim about a past made out of a present. Each is an error in the place where the searching was declared over. Not one is a case of a search going wrong while it was still going.

So the psychology of introspective failure is not an argument against the immediate. It is a careful map of where the stopping happens, and I would rather have it than not.

Notice that I have not called the mind an instrument for receiving inner objects. That picture is what is being argued against here, and it does not improve by being extended inward.

Two motions

Aristotle allowed two natural motions. Gravity, which goes down in a straight line. Levity, which goes up and eventually turns and goes round.

Newton opens his first law with corpus omne — every body — and the distinction is finished. One kind of body. One natural motion, uniform and straight, laid out between a positive and a negative. Heidegger’s remark is that the Aristotelian division between earthly and celestial has by then become obsolete, and obsolete is the right word. Levity was not refuted. It was dropped, because the new motion had no place to put it.

Haldeman’s title is a witch’s ingredient with two letters added: eye of newt, I of Newton. I take it more seriously than it was meant. There is an I in Newton, and it is exactly what corpus omne has no place to put.

I want this vocabulary because it does not have a subject or an object anywhere in it. It is not about minds facing things. It is about which motions are admitted.

Questioning is levity. It rises, and then it turns, and the turning is the return. Doubt is levity with the turn forbidden — rising and rising and never coming round, which is exactly what it means to say that doubt cannot arrive and cannot stop.

And that motion has a mathematical statement. A bounded monotone increasing sequence. Monotone: it never turns back. Bounded: it cannot get away. Forbid the turning and forbid the escaping, and the axiom of completeness will hand you a single point at the top and tell you the point is real.

The demon’s answer to the third question is the second clause spoken aloud as a boast. There is nowhere he cannot come back from. He cannot get away. Omnipotence, in the one respect that turns out to matter, is a boundary. He is the point at the top of the sequence, real because the axiom says so, and wearing sunglasses.

Monotone is vagus struck out by stipulation. The sequence does not wander, not because anyone found out that it doesn’t, but because wandering was excluded in the setup. Nothing was discovered. A condition was imposed, and uniqueness came out the other side.

The induction of inductions

Measure a plank. Whole metres first, then decimetres, then centimetres, and at every stage there is a little more plank left over than your last mark. The process ends when the tape runs out, or the eyes fail, or the measurer loses interest. The axiom then assures you that a real number exists for the actual length, and that there is an actual length.

Now make the same move with people instead of decimetres. Science does not rest on one reading. It compares records made on different nights by different hands, judges which differences are systematic and which are noise, and concludes that what has held will go on holding.

Hume named the difficulty and I will not spend long on it. The inference requires that unobserved cases resemble observed ones, and that principle cannot be established deductively without assuming itself. He concluded that induction is not the work of reason but of the imagination.

The general form is what I am after. All replicated measurements, never finished, may be treated as finished.

That is the induction of inductions, and it is the axiom of completeness made outside the language of numbers. The structure matches at every point. A sequence of replications, each narrowing the estimate. Bounded, since the value is not infinite. Monotone in precision, since the intervals are supposed to nest and shrink. And never finished, because the experiment can always be run once more, and there is always a further place of precision the method has not reached. Then the move: assert the limit, and call the limit the true value.

Consensus is the least upper bound, and it is the least one that matters — a least upper bound is unique. That uniqueness is the whole trick. Where there were many observers with many offsets there is now one number, and the many-to-one has become one-to-one, which is Russell’s definition of the non-vague achieved by stipulation rather than by looking. The observers are supposed to drop out at the limit. Their offsets cancel and what remains is the object itself, unmediated. That is the escape from the first person. It is asserted, not found.

What remains when all the observers have dropped out has a name, and it is not a joke that the name is a demon. In 1814 Laplace imagined an intellect that knew, at a single instant, every force and every position in nature, for which nothing would be uncertain and the future would stand as plainly present as the past. His readers took to calling it Laplace’s demon. It is the least upper bound of all observers, imagined as somebody. The equation summons it, said the right way.

The demon in the classroom has a place in mind for Sam’s soul: a universe run by binary digits, where Sam could start out as a decimal and gradually work his way up to a fraction. Consider what that promotion is. A decimal that goes on without ever repeating is the least governable thing in arithmetic. A fraction is a decimal that has agreed to repeat. Damnation, in this cosmology, is a career in which you advance by becoming more determinate. The profession runs the same ladder and calls it rigour.

The error bar is the “…”. It is notation standing in for the rest of an investigation nobody carried out. A meta-analysis is a sequence of studies with a limit taken.

And the cost is the cost of the plank. Is that precise enough recurs at every level of magnification, and it is answered by declaring the unfinished sequence finished. Which shuts out more than it means to. The motive for taking the limit is not curiosity; it is the craving for certainty, and the fear of doubt, and those two names describe one condition. That is the curse word woven into the invocation. A mathematician cannot rest in an unfinished sequence. A profession cannot rest in a result that might not replicate. So the sequence is closed by decree, and because doubt and questioning are the same motion with and without the turn, forbidding the one forbids the other. The monotone condition does not distinguish between them and cannot. It only says: do not come back.

In this perfect wakefulness the light does not radiate, does not twinkle, no-one blinks.

Except that the equation is on a blackboard, and it is looked at by a man who blinks.

What does not stop

Something survives all this, and it is not evidence.

Some searching will not finish where the formula said it would finish. The bridge is not behaving, and the engineer goes back and looks again. The trial fails and someone runs it again. The result will not replicate no matter who runs it, so it goes on being run.

I used to describe this as an appearance overruling an inference. That was wrong in a way worth marking, because it smuggles back the picture this essay is against: two items, each with content, and a contest between them settled by contradiction. There is no such contest.

Here is what happens instead, and the shape of it is already in the mathematics. A positive definition states what a thing is. A dialectical one states the limits of a proposed definition — it does not aim at the essence, it aims at where the proposal gives out. Analysis students think continuity through dialectically, epsilon answering delta, and then remove the dialectical shape and put a proof in its place. An open set could be defined as not its boundary, and then some boundaries would have to be found by ongoing inquiry rather than declared.

The bridge falling is a boundary that ongoing inquiry has to find. The engineer had a positive definition, complete, with a stopping-place written into it. The stopping-place did not arrive. He is returned to the dialectical case, where the limits of the proposal are what is at issue and somebody has to go and look for them.

That is why it costs. Nobody has been refuted. Everybody is still looking.

Which is the same event as the axiom, seen from the other side. The axiom declares an unfinished search finished. This is a search that will not be declared finished. One is the apparatus closing the sequence; the other is the sequence refusing to close. The cost is the same cost either way, and the only question is whether it is paid by the decree or by the looking.

And it falls in either domain. The engineer in front of a structure that is not behaving. The practitioner who goes on seeing, plainly and unwillingly, what cuts against his teacher, his doctrine and his hopes for himself. The professor at the blackboard after the demon has gone. None receives a refutation. None can stop looking. Same event. Same currency.

Comparing observers requires an observer

Here is where the standard picture cannot be repaired.

Astronomy found this out in the most literal way. In 1796 the Astronomer Royal dismissed his assistant for timing star transits later than he did. Twenty-six years later Bessel compared his own timings with those of colleagues no one would have dismissed, and found steady personal offsets larger than the one that had cost the assistant his post. The correction built from them was called the personal equation.

But Bessel did not step outside himself to discover that he and his colleagues differed. He looked at the records. He judged the difference systematic and not noise. He decided how many nights were enough. Every one of those acts is the kind of act the personal equation exists to correct for, and every one was performed in the first person, unassisted, by a man with an offset of his own.

The only thing that could stop this regress is an observer who needs no correction: one who compares all the observers without being one of them, who has no offset because he has no position, who can come back from anywhere because he was never anywhere in particular. That is the demon’s job description exactly. And the demon is a character in a television programme.

There is no regress-stopper. There never has been. Each correction of first-person judgment is designed, applied and evaluated by first-person judgment, and if you go looking for the level at which this stops being true you will not find it. You will only find people, looking.

Which means the apparatus of objectivity is not a way of getting out. It is a way of getting a better result from inside, and the difference matters enormously in practice and not at all in principle.

What the agreement costs

The serious defence of third-person method is not that any individual scientist errs less than any contemplative. It is that errors are uncorrelated. My misreading and yours are independent, so when we pool, noise cancels and signal stands.

So look at what the profession does to produce its agreements. Shared training. Common instruments from common manufacturers. A standardized vocabulary in which the phenomenon may be described. Peer review by people trained in that vocabulary. Replication by protocols fixed in advance. Textbooks that settle what a competent observation is before anyone observes anything.

Every one of these is a correlating operation, built deliberately and well to make two observers more alike. The agreement they produce cannot then be cited as independent convergence upon the object, because independence was the thing being removed. Consensus is both the output of the correction machinery and an input to it, and the relation runs the wrong way for comfort: the tighter the correction, the less the eventual agreement tells you.

Bugaev, arguing in 1897 against the mathematical fixation on completeness, called incompleteness a manifestation of independent individuality and autonomy. He was talking about the number line and he was talking about this. A unique least upper bound is individuality removed — one value standing where many observers stood. The guild’s shared training and the axiom’s uniqueness clause are one operation performed at two scales, and that is why the sociological complaint about guilds and the epistemological defence of method are not two conversations. The institution erodes its own justification in the act of performing it.

Follow the road to its end and you arrive at the demon: consensus with nobody left in it. One knower, perfectly agreed with himself, and no independence remaining to spend.

I am not saying the corrections are bad. They are why the bridges stand. I am saying they buy reliability by spending independence, and you cannot spend it and still have it.

The inversion

The standard picture has trained attention waiting outside, hoping to be licensed by objective method — hoping that one day the disciplines of the inner will be validated by instruments and thereby allowed to count.

The dependency runs the other way.

Discriminating what is there from what you expected to be there. Noticing that you are tired, that you are invested, that you have already decided. Holding attention steady enough to register a small change nothing prompted you to look for. Every gauge-reading in the history of the world has run on these.

And when you examine what the apparatus consists of, you find prosthetics for known defects in exactly these capacities. Blinding manages expectation. Pre-registration manages the drift of a hope into a hypothesis. Instrumentation replaces a judgment that fatigues with a trace that does not. The personal equation corrects a constant in a man’s attention that the man could not feel.

You cannot build a prosthetic without knowing what is failing. Each device encodes something known about attention, and then conceals where it came from by working so well that nobody has to think about the defect again.

Imagine the prosthetics finished — every correction applied, nothing left over to correct — and you have the demon again. A superb artificial leg with no one walking on it.

Attention is not the worse instrument. It is the instrument the others are corrections to.

The line and the return

There are two shapes a correction can take, and the difference is the difference between an equation and a return.

Identity is a line. Even written as A = A it needs two positions and a sign between them holding the gap closed; you cannot write “A =” and have said anything. Selfhood on that model is an assertion of sameness across a distance, and it needs the gap covered, exactly as the axiom covers the gaps in the line.

The demon’s terms are lines of this kind. A question and its answer. A task and its completion. Two terms and a sign between them, the gap to be closed by his powers, and his powers close every such gap there is. Sam’s move is to decline the shape. Not a question: a command. And get lost has no completion the demon could hand back. Its fulfilment is a going with no guaranteed return, which is the one shape his powers were not built in.

He can come back from anywhere. That sounds like the return and is its opposite, because he has never been away. A return needs a going it does not control. What the demon has is a line folded double.

The other shape needs no equals sign. One object, and coming back to it. Aristotle’s point that circular motion cannot be defined by an opposition is the relevant one: the present you, reading, and returning to the present you, reading, is enough for motion, and there is no second term. Nothing is claimed to be the same. Heraclitus has it already — we step and do not step in the same rivers.

Sitting still and watching is the second shape. It is a correction too, but of a different kind from the astronomers’. A linear correction has an output: a number you subtract, after which the matter need not be attended to again. The return produces no number. Nothing is stored, nothing accrues, and tomorrow you do it again with no credit from today. The output of the practice is the practice.

That is why the objectivity apparatus can forget its origin and the practice cannot.

And the two treat wandering in opposite ways. Blinding, protocol, pre-registration, fixed vocabulary — every one is engineered to keep the mind from going where it will. The return does not prevent the going. It consents to it and adds the coming back. One approach removes the wandering. The other keeps the wandering and adds the turn.

Which gives the perversion its shape. Doubt is wandering with the turn taken out, and an apparatus built of protocols against a wandering never permitted to come round does not contain doubt. It institutionalizes it, and then covers the hole with a limit so that the asking stops by decree rather than by arrival.

Constants

The impermanence of constants is not a mystical objection and I want to state it carefully, because the careless version is easy to dismiss.

Physics does check this. Variation in the fine-structure constant has been probed against the natural fission reactor at Oklo, two billion years old, against absorption lines in quasar spectra, against the abundances of the light elements formed in the first minutes. The bounds are tight, and they reach back very far. Anyone who says nobody has looked deserves to be stopped at the first paragraph.

But every one of those bounds is derived inside a framework that assumes the stability it is testing. The Oklo constraint is read out of nuclear physics taken to have been the same nuclear physics. This is not a scandal and there is no way around it. It is what testing a constant necessarily looks like from inside, and the error bar on the result is calculated using the assumption in question.

The constant feels constant. That feeling is a fervour about something only time can report on, and the report is being written in the language whose stability is at issue.

The demon, asked his second question, said he could break the laws of physics and step through time whenever he liked. It is the one claim in the episode that could only be checked by the party making it. Nobody in the classroom thought to ask how he knew.

Two things I am not saying

That a profession’s first job is self-preservation, I hold to. Its first job, not its only one. People inside these institutions do careful, honest and expensive work, and much of it survives the pressure it is under. If “first” slides into “only,” the argument becomes a complaint, and a complaint is easy to put down.

And contemplative institutions gatekeep at least as hard as universities. Lineage, authorization, the approved description of what you saw, the quiet disappearance of the student whose experience did not fit the map. I concede this early because it costs the argument nothing. My claim concerns the structure of investigation, not which guild has nicer people. Every guild correlates its members. That is what a guild is for.

Where this sits

Husserl described objective science as a construction out of the lifeworld that forgot it was a construction. Merleau-Ponty treated the objective attitude as a derived posture concealing its origin. James took introspection as a primary method and gave it the seriousness of any laboratory procedure. Fleck showed that a thought-collective determines what can be seen at all. Gieryn named the boundary work by which a profession draws the line around itself. Daston and Galison traced mechanical objectivity as a discipline of self-restraint — the observer suppressing his own judgment, an inner exercise throughout. Varela built a research programme on the dependency instead of arguing about it. Schaffer read the personal equation as observatory discipline, a chronometric regime for the surveillance of subordinate observers.

I want the demon for something else: for the licensing relation, for the fact that the tools of objectivity are made out of what attention has learned about itself and cannot be made any other way, and for the one task that the finished observer cannot perform.

Back to the blackboard

There is a detail I have saved.

When the demon is gone, the equation is still on the board, and still wrong. The episode never solves it. Sam goes back to it, complaining that the demon wasn’t any help at all.

I want to mark what follows as mine rather than Haldeman’s. He wrote a joke, and a very good one, and this is laid over it rather than found in it. But the complaint is exact. The demon could have answered anything Sam asked and could not help, because what Sam wanted was never the answer. He wanted to get it right, and getting it right is done at a blackboard by a man who blinks, going back to the same line and finding it not quite the same line. An answer handed down by a being who has never been lost is a number with nobody’s looking in it. Omniscience was no help with the equation for the same reason it could not see white.

Science has this ending too, and tells it less well. Having established the personal equation, Bessel found that it drifts — with the year, with the instrument, with the man. So the correction had to be remade, and remaking it meant going back to the same place: a person attending to a star and to himself at once. Astronomy got the motion right and the description wrong, and it was the description that was institutionalized.

We have been going back ever since. We only stopped saying so.

And there is a reason to care beyond the accounting. If the searching is not in doubt, then the endless refinement toward a precision that never arrives is the intellect sharpening a vagueness it did not find sharp, and the appearances we were told to look past were never deficient. What follows from that is happiness, which is a longer argument and one I have made elsewhere. Here I only want the ground it stands on: this, now, still being looked for.

Hope

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Hope for Nothing in Particular

Hope takes a proposition. You hope that something, and the complement has to be a declarative sentence, and before it can be a declarative sentence the outcome has to be cut out of the vague and given edges. Hope cannot begin until the boundary is drawn. It arrives after the sharpening, dependent on it, the affect of a world already resolved. Wonder is the other kind. You wonder whether, you wonder why, you wonder at. The complement is a question, or there is no complement.

Because hope needs an outcome specified it also needs a holder. It is a claim on the future held by someone who must remain intact long enough to hold the claim. That is its structure, and the structure is credit rather than warmth. The beneficiary may be anyone, or no one yet born; the holder is the one who cannot go missing. Dissolving would forfeit it. This is why hope disqualifies you at the door: reception asks for the overflowing of the self, and the self that hopes has already refused, for the soundest of reasons, since it is holding something.

And it is consumed. When its object arrives, fulfilment ends a hope and disappointment ends a hope. Either way, it is spent. The salt is unchanged by every encounter with it. No hope survives its own object arriving.

It also needs its twin. Aquinas made hope a virtue and despair a sin, and the pairing gives the game away. They are one affect on one axis, and hope rescues you from despair the way the raised end of a see-saw rescues you from the lowered end. Hope does not save you from the pit. It digs the pit and hands you a rope.

The gate of Dante’s hell says to abandon hope, and the architecture behind the gate says something else. Farinata explains that the damned see the far future clearly and are blind to what is happening now, and that when time ends and there is no more future their knowledge will die. That is hope administered as a punishment. A self preserved intact, aimed entirely at what has not come, denied the present. Hell is not the absence of hope. It is hope with the present surgically removed.

I wrote in the margin of a book on real analysis, at twenty-six, that for in truth there is no hope, only wonder.

And still I have hope.

Not for anything. Nothing completes the sentence. There is no that, no outcome with edges, no future in which the claim matures, nobody standing by to collect. What is left when all of that is stripped out is not an attitude toward events. It is a love of something obscene. Eating. Sleeping. Shitting. A woman across the room doing exactly the same things. The joke is bad and the badness is the whole of it, because salvation contains no jokes and this does. The finer the idea, the more naked and indecent we are.

I do not need life to continue. I do not need death either. Both cravings put down, becoming and un-becoming, and the natural inference from here is that what remains is cold, an emptiness with the lights off, indifference dressed as attainment. That inference is wrong. What remains is warm, and what it is warm toward is the eating and the shitting. This is the true ordinary. It is not reached by rising. It is what is there when the ledger is closed.

The word carries a frame with it, and the frame is why the word is nearly unusable. Christianity’s move was to make hope a duty and give it an object, and once hope was obligatory despair became a sin, and once despair was a sin the axis was installed in everyone and could be operated from outside. Hope defers. Endure now, be paid later. Anything that defers can be administered, and the administration of deferral is most of what power has ever done. Hope is spent by arrival, which is why an object that never arrives keeps it alive indefinitely, and why deferral is not a failure of the promise but its maintenance. The Christ I can still hear speaks urgently in the present tense. Consider the lilies. Sufficient unto the day. Today you will be with me. That voice does not ask anyone to wait. The waiting is institutional. An apparatus took someone who ate with the wrong people and converted him into a promissory note, which is precisely hope’s operation performed at scale: turning what is here into what is owed. Christ was good. Christianity is his opposite. The whole mess is deadly.

So the hope I am keeping is not the one at the gate. Dante’s damned kept the future and lost the present. I have made the opposite trade, and it is not a sacrifice, and there is nothing noble in it. I gave up what was never mine to hold and was given back the ordinary, which was always here, and which is obscene, and which is funny, and which does not need me to persist in order to go on being what it is.

Wonder

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Wonder Without a Wonderer

Wonder does not depend on a wonderer. Not in the empty room, where the claim is easy, and not in the encounter, where it is hard. The stronger claim begins there. At the moment wonder arrives, there is no wonderer left to receive it. There is no small person standing before a large universe, admiring it. There is no self congratulating itself on its sensitivity, saying: I am a person capable of wonder. To identify as a wonderer is already to have missed the entry.

This is not humility as an attitude. It is not the self making itself modest before something greater. Self-effacement is a condition of reception. Wonder enters only where the person who would possess it has momentarily ceased to stand apart.

Wonder “dissolves in water like salt.” It was already in the world before it entered us. Dissolution neither creates nor consumes it. The salt is dispersed but not exhausted; it can fill the water without becoming water. Wonder is not manufactured by the one who encounters it, and it is not diminished by being encountered.

But the water is not a person, nor is it a particular mind. It is an overflowing of an individual self. There are two dissolutions and one solvent: the salt goes into the water, and the self goes into the water, and that is where they meet. Neither has to become the other. There is no need to say that one becomes nothing and therefore becomes the world. Salt remains salt even when no grain can be found.

This is why closing the eyes against the world is the wrong movement. It makes the world disappear so that the self may remain protected from it. Wonder requires the reverse: a self-disappearance, not a world-disappearance. The stars remain stars. The tree remains bark, leaf, insect, rot and light. Nothing has to become a symbol of us. The world does not vanish into mind, and the mind does not acquire the world as an identity. The separation simply ceases to be important.

Wonder also feels good. Plainly good. It contains no necessary moment of terror, no failure of the imagination, no recoil in which the self rediscovers its own magnitude by surviving what overwhelmed it. Wonder is therefore not a gentler form of the sublime. It moves differently. The sublime threatens the boundary of the self and then, often, restores it. Wonder does not threaten the boundary. It forgets it.

The bodily sign may be pīti: the rising brightness, the shiver through the skin, the sudden lightness or flooding of the body. The same shiver may come in a formal meditation or during an honest inquiry into the natural world. The traditional grades of pīti distinguish its intensity, not the prestige of its source. A breath, a theorem, the underside of a leaf, a difficult question or the night sky may each open the same passage.

The object is therefore irrelevant, except that some objects work better for practice than others. A distant galaxy has no intrinsic spiritual superiority to a stone. But the galaxy may loosen one person more readily, while the stone may teach another to remain. What matters is not what the object means but what our attention ceases to insist upon in its presence.

Wonder can be practiced. This makes it a path rather than an aesthetic preference. One can learn the conditions under which the self loosens, learn to remain without immediately claiming the experience, learn not to turn wonder into evidence of being a wonderful person. Practice does not manufacture the salt. It allows the water to receive it.

The same movement occurs in inquiry. The intellect hallucinates sharpness. It draws a boundary and then mistakes the incision for a discovery. But the boundary generates incompatible verdicts: this belongs, this does not belong; this is the same, this is different; this follows, this cannot follow. Contradiction appears to be a tension in the world, although it was produced by the sharpness with which the intellect divided the world. Sharpness and contradiction are not two errors. They are the two visible sides of one artifact.

Inquiry need not resolve the conflict by drawing a still sharper line. Inquiry relaxes conflicting sharp positions. Relaxation is not surrender, vagueness or intellectual laziness. It is the refusal to force one of the conflicting verdicts into sovereignty merely because the mind cannot bear their coexistence. Misery does not lie in thought. It lies in the direction thought takes when it tightens around its distinctions and then suffers the wounds those distinctions produce.

Relaxation in thought is the same movement as dissolution in the body. The propositions remain, as the salt remains. What disappears is the claimant who must make one of them final. Wonder and inquiry are therefore not separate paths—one ecstatic and the other intellectual. They are one motion described in two registers.

The stars, secretly, listen to our wonder. They do not need ears, intentions or knowledge of us. Our astonishment leaves the mouth as breath and sound and enters matter again. The wonderer is heard only as something material: a vibration, a little heat, an emission where there is no reception. Nothing answers. Nothing needs to. The cry has already returned to what made it possible.

This is the opening claim run outward. Wonder needs no wonderer in order to be received; the cry needs no listener in order to be complete. What leaves the mouth is sound: matter, associated with none. It no longer belongs to the mind that made it, and it does not thin out for want of an ear. The stars are not used up by being looked at, and our astonishment is not wasted by going unheard.

Pīti is fabricated. The wonderer is fabricated too. This does not defeat the practice. An axe handle is also fabricated, yet through use it wears away in the hand. We do not mistake the handle for the destination. Wonder is passage, not arrival. Ecstasy may be required only until ecstasy no longer feels exceptional—until the impersonal brightness of things becomes the true ordinary.

But perhaps “return” is the wrong word for this. Water has no first term to which we can return. Every source has another source, and every dissolution occurs in something already flowing. We begin, moreover, inside minds that have already sharpened themselves—minds whose sharp distinctions tell them what inquiry is and what relaxation cannot be.

How can relaxation begin from inside that sharpness without becoming one more sharp command?

The question asks for a method, which is the sharp genre inquiring after its own cure. But the handle was not worn down by a decision to wear it. It went because the axe was used for what an axe is for. Perhaps relaxation does not begin at all. Perhaps it is only what sharpness does under long and honest use.

That may be where inquiry begins.

Soul of Rome

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Is found in the airport.
Air hurries to repair the loss of everyone evacuating.
The airplane knows it has no soul,
Knows like an insect knows its own body, Only better.
The soul is in a full sail.
Like space does nothing to present a painted theater,
The sail does no real work.
The strain is only to hold itself together as a sail, And follow the wind.
Engines do their work by other metaphor,
And are only vaguely errant.
Souls of Rome are run over by knowing and working things,

And can still be found in the cracks of a concrete runway.
The crack is the new road

For wild green things

Rome conquered.

tri-angel

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tri-angel

the claw of power held low
conjuring the winds of chaos
feel the winds, remember their frisson—
one guess promising another.
Does the wind give way to you?

they reach to save me
the claw so low, pulling all the saviors off their balance
The dog on his back, trying to catch flies
The bell-song; a shell containing all the breath of the World
cuts short all at once

The free winds are less than a symbol
tri, tri to be free and you will run in a circle
all the doors open, all beckoning, all the equals and opposites

You give way to the wind, you let it pass through you and when you are gone

Only the wind remains

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There is a distinction at the root of logic that no one is supposed to touch. On one side, the conditional: →, the “if, then.” On the other, the turnstile: ⊢, the mark of the conclusion, the sign that says and therefore. The first lives inside your sentences. The second stands outside them and passes judgment. One is a claim; the other is the act of drawing a claim out. The distinction goes back to Aristotle, and there is a theorem — a real one, the deduction theorem — that stands guard over the border between them: A ⊢ B exactly when ⊢ A → B. The bridge is proved. The distinction is earned. It is not an accident of notation. This is the part I want the Serious reader to hear clearly, because I am about to deny it, and I would like the denial to cost something.

Ramage, following Burke, has a name for that reader. Serious People — capitalized, no quotation marks, a species walking around with a proper noun — are the ones for whom the distinction is not a tool but a foundation. To such a reader, → and ⊢ must stay apart, because keeping them apart is what makes deduction deduction, argument argument, and progress progress. Erase the line and you have not made a point; you have vandalized the building. The Serious Person cannot hear “let us call these two symbols the same” as a move. They hear it as a category error, and they get angry, and the anger is the whole tell — but we will come to that.

So let me do the vandalism.

Set the turnstile down for a moment. Just → and ∧, no judgment, no therefore. A valid argument — A, and A → B, so B — is supposed to be the paradigm of getting somewhere. But look at what [A ∧ (A → B)] actually is. Row by row it is nothing other than [A ∧ B]. The two are the same object; the truth table does not distinguish them. So the celebrated inference from A and A → B to B is, stripped of the turnstile that dresses it up, the deduction of B from [A ∧ B]. You already had B.

The small word doing the holding here has its own buried history. Old English and, ond meant “thereupon, next.” Etymonline carries it through Proto-Germanic unda back toward the Proto-Indo-European root en, “in.” Those are different historical depths, so it would be too neat to say that and once simply meant in. Yet the descent lets the ear recover what the notation loses: beneath the word of succession — this, and then this — lies an in-root, the shape of containment. The turnstile’s and therefore repeats the drift, making a whole sound like a step and what is held sound as though it has arrived. This is not another knife hidden in language. It is an inheritance from our fathers and mothers: the holding still audible beneath the going-on, the parent still present in the child.[^1]

It was sitting inside the conjunction the whole time. All the argument did was take out a knife and cut A away.

That is what deduction is. Not a road but a subtraction. Not “this, then this, then this,” but one whole thing, and a cut. Deduction — the word means taking-away, and it is telling the truth about itself; we simply stopped listening. The “if, then” persuaded us we were traveling. We were only ever trimming.

Now — and here is the sentence the Serious Person cannot forgive — the only reason this is hard to see is the very distinction they are guarding. Keep → and ⊢ apart and the collapse is illegal: A, A → B, ⊢ B does not fold into [A ∧ B] → B, because the turnstile refuses to be a connective. The distinction conceals the cut. Blur it — allow a little vagueness exactly where precision is prized — and the cut stands revealed. This is the reversal the mathematicians will not like: it was not vagueness that hid the truth of deduction. It was precision. The sharp line did the concealing. The blur did the revealing.

There is a verb for what I have just done. To quine a distinction — the word is Dennett’s, coined half in affection for the philosopher who made a career of it — is to deny, with a straight face and on purpose, the reality or the importance of something a careful person takes to be plainly there; and denying the importance of the turnstile is exactly the move of the last few paragraphs.[^2]

Now I want to set the argument down for a moment and look at something quieter, which is the reader.

Burke has a phrase for it: the terministic screen. Any set of terms we think with lies over the world like a screen, and a screen does two things in the same motion — it shows some of what is there and it hides the rest. The showing is why we keep the terms; they let us see. The hiding happens on the far side, where we are not looking, and so we never feel it. From inside, a screen does not seem like a screen at all. It seems like the world.

The distinction between → and ⊢ is a screen of this kind, and a good one. It shows something real: the two marks do different work, and there is even a theorem that measures the exact distance between them.[^3] But the same distinction hides the smaller fact underneath — that the inference was a cut from a whole you already held. A person who works with logic looks through that screen many times a day and sees inference, sees progress, sees new things arriving. The screen is doing its job well. It shows the movement and keeps the knife out of view. And because a screen is clear from the inside, that person does not think of themselves as looking through terms at all. They think they are seeing how reasoning simply is.

So the disagreement here is not really about a proof. When someone lifts the turnstile away and says the inference was a subtraction the whole time, the difficulty a careful reader feels is not that the claim is unproven — it is the odd discomfort of a screen coming into view while you are still standing behind it. That discomfort is worth naming plainly, because it is easy to mistake for a refutation and it is not one. It is just what it feels like when terms you had been looking through become, for a second, terms you are looking at.

And I say this without a perch to say it from. I have my own screens, thick in the places I would be last to notice, and someone will someday lift one of mine and I will feel the same discomfort and mistake it, briefly, for being wronged. The point of the exercise is not to have caught anyone out. It is only to turn a screen a few degrees, so its edge catches the light and you see, once, that it has an edge. After that the distinction is yours again. You can pick it back up — it is a good tool and it earns its place — but you will be holding it now, instead of seeing through it.

This is not an argument for collapsing logic into rhetoric, or rhetoric into logic, but an attempt to make their border audible.


Here is the thing I want to guard, and I will tell you why it is mine to guard.

Go back to the cut. When you take A and A → B and draw out B, you keep the conclusion and you drop the premise. The “if, then” is built for exactly this: it points the whole sentence at the result and lets the reason that fathered it fall away. Say it the other way — touch the hot pan and you are burned — and the two halves stand together, the cause beside its child. I taught my daughter both ways once. The “and” keeps the father in the room. The “if, then” sends him out.

There is an old coincidence in the word for it. Robot comes from a Slavic root for forced labor, robota, and the same deep root reaches back toward a word for the one bound to serve because there is no father to stand between the child and the work — an orphan.[^4] The machine that computes our truth tables without learning anything is an orphan in exactly this sense: it keeps the conclusion and has lost the parent. It can carry out the cut flawlessly and cannot tell you what was cut. This used to be a figure of speech. It is now furniture in the room where I work.

And the man whose name became the verb for this — to quine, to deny the importance of a distinction — is the father of the whole procedure. Quine had his typewriter rebuilt to carry logical symbols, and among the keys he gave up to make room was the question mark. Asked how he managed without it, he is said to have replied that he dealt in certainties.[^5] Think about what that instrument could and could not do. It could assert, negate, quantify, conclude. It could not ask. He built a machine for a mind that had finished asking, and he is the ancestor of the argument I have been making, which arrives at the conclusion that the certainty was purchased and the distinction was never backed by a fact. The father of the cut disarmed his own instrument of the one mark that keeps the reason in the room.

The mind that deals in certainties has a history.

In The Order of Things, Michel Foucault describes the sixteenth-century order of knowledge in which resemblance did the constructive work that distinction later claimed. Its world was read through similitudes: convenientia, the kinship of things near enough for their edges to touch; aemulatio, likeness acting across distance; analogy; sympathy. Knowledge moved along bonds and correspondences. Earth echoed sky; the plant answered the star; one being became legible through another. The world was not yet primarily a table of separate things. It was a web of resemblances in which things could be known by being held together.

With the Classical age of the seventeenth century, Foucault says, resemblance lost that authority. Comparison was disciplined into measurement and order, identity and difference; the open web of similitudes became the table. Resemblance did not vanish, but it was pushed to the border of knowledge. It might bring two things together for comparison, yet knowledge properly began only when the likeness was converted into equality, inequality, or ordered difference. Certainty was purchased by moving from what resembled what to where each thing could be placed.

This does not make the Renaissance true and the Classical age false. Foucault is not offering us a lost Eden, and neither am I. It makes a more modest and more dangerous point: the Serious Person’s certainty that knowledge is distinction is not the eternal form of thought. It has a history. Burke tells us what a terministic screen does; Foucault shows this one becoming a condition under which knowledge could appear. And he leaves its seam exposed: no relation of equality or order can be established unless resemblance has first occasioned the comparison. Distinction needs the likeness it disqualifies. The table is fathered by the web and forgets its parent.[^6]

I keep the other mark. The whole of this blog is named for it. And the mark itself has a history that should embarrass anyone who thinks precision is where clarity lives. The question mark is credited to Alcuin, Charlemagne’s schoolmaster, the man who carried the Trivium — grammar, logic, rhetoric — back into the world; though the earliest hand that actually made the mark seems to have belonged not to him but to a scribe a year ahead of him, so that even the question mark is a child claimed by a famous father it may not have.[^7] A later writer looked at that first faint stroke over a dot and called it a lightning flash. I have looked at the thing itself, the real ink from twelve hundred years ago, and it is not a lightning bolt. It is a lean, a small diagonal, a mark that only becomes lightning when someone with a gift for phrases lays the lightning over it. Which is the whole argument again, written in the first punctuation of inquiry: the vivid distinction is a screen; the humble stroke is what is there.

My father spent his last years on the opposite end of the same knife, and I did not see it was the same knife until I had carried our one shared paper to print without him. His book divides the news into its questions — who, where, what, when, why — and tracks each across a century: the realist three, who and where and what, fading into the background; the modernist two, when and why, swelling to fill it; all five moving contrary to what everyone had assumed. That is the book. But the paper, the one with both our names on it, makes the other move. It takes the five back apart-ness and synthesizes it — fuses the “what” with the “when,” matter with motion, the concrete now with the context that had been prying it open — into what Whitehead called the actual occasion: the drop of experience that grows whole, all at once, and cannot be divided in the moment it is had. The division into five Ws, the paper says, is something the intellect does after the fact. Many things come together to form the occasion, and then are cut apart by the mind, which mistakes its own cutting for the structure of the world.

Sit with that beside everything above, because it is the same sentence. He says the actual occasion is one thing, and the five questions are a cut the intellect makes in it after the fact. I say the inference is one thing — A and B, already held — and the arrow and the turnstile are a cut the intellect makes in it after the fact. His knife and mine are the same knife, watched from opposite ends of a life. What he called the occasion, I call the conjunction you already had. What he called the division into Ws, I call the deduction that keeps the answer and orphans the reason. He un-divides the news back into the now; I show that the proof was only ever a subtraction.

And in the middle of his paper, on the page where he says precision does nothing but divide things into smaller metaphors and then pretends the last metaphor is not one, the reference is to me — to “Many Roads from the Axiom of Completeness,” a thing I wrote at thirty-three that he had spent hours helping me draw out, and whose name he would not take. There were things in it he did not endorse, and he was right about some of them. He hosted it on his own site without his name and cited it into this paper all the same. So the seam is not agreement. It is something rarer: an argument he helped me make, disagreed with in parts, declined to sign, and quoted anyway into the last paper that carries both our names. He drew the reasoning out of me and let the conclusion stay mine.

The orphan-machine on my desk performs my end of the cut without a tremor and cannot feel what it divided. Quine, who fathered the whole procedure, deleted from his instrument the one mark that keeps the reason in the room, and dealt thereafter in certainties. The first faint form of that deleted mark — a lean over a dot that a later writer mistook for lightning — was set down in a Carolingian scriptorium and credited, rightly or not, to the schoolmaster who carried rhetoric back into the world as one of the three roads of the mind; so that even the sign of the question is a child claimed by a father who may not be its own. This is the house I guard and the lineage I will not cut: the answer is not the reason, the five questions are not the occasion, and the mark at the end of the sentence is not a lightning bolt. It is the smallest opening we have, kept on purpose, back toward the undivided thing the intellect is always in a hurry to carve. My father closed his last argument by fusing the questions back into the now. I keep a whole blog open by refusing to let the cut be called progress. We were doing the same thing from opposite directions the entire time — he from the answers back toward the occasion, I from the occasion forward against the proof. Attention is the only inheritance that does not orphan its heir.



1. The Online Etymology Dictionary entry for and gives Old English and, ond, originally
“thereupon, next,” from Proto-Germanic unda, and derives that form from the Proto-
Indo-European root en, “in.” The body deliberately says “back toward” and distinguishes
the historical layers: the attested Old English sense and the reconstructed root do not
license the flat claim that and once meant in. The containment/succession reading is this
essay’s synthesis.


2. Daniel Dennett’s The Philosophical Lexicon defines the verb to quine as denying resolutely
the existence or importance of something real or significant — an affectionate coinage
after W. V. O. Quine, whose radicalism consistently took the form of denying cherished
distinctions (the analytic/synthetic, propositions, determinate reference).103


3. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans.
Alan Sheridan (English ed., 1970), Part I, chapters 2–3, especially “The Four Similitudes,”
“The Limits of the World,” and “The Order of Things.” Foucault’s explicit contrast is
between the sixteenth-century/Renaissance episteme of resemblance and the seventeenth-
century Classical episteme of representation, measure, order, identity, and difference; “me-
dieval” alone would be too broad for the historical claim as written here. The language
of parentage, inheritance, web, and table is the present essay’s synthesis rather than Fou-
cault’s own conclusion. See the publisher’s edition.


4. The deduction theorem: A ⊢B iff ⊢A →B. This is exactly the “proved bridge” that makes
the →/⊢distinction earned rather than arbitrary. The claim of this essay is not that the
distinction is false — it tracks something real — but that it conceals the subtractive nature
of the inference it licenses. That is a different and stronger charge than arbitrariness.


5. Robota (Slavic, “forced labor”) →Čapek’s R.U.R. is solid. The onward link to orphan
runs through the Proto-Indo-European root orbh- (“bereft, passing to another’s charge”),
which is a real but looser scholarly connection, not a settled etymological identity.


6. The Quine typewriter (a Remington modified to carry logical symbols, the question mark
among the sacrificed keys) and the “I deal in certainties” reply circulate widely as Quine
lore. The exact wording has not been confirmed against a primary source; the essay
therefore retains it as reported speech (“is said to have replied”).


7. Confirmed against sources. The punctus interrogativus (a diagonal stroke over a dot)
appeared in late-8th-century Carolingian minuscule; it is traditionally credited to Alcuin
of York, Charlemagne’s schoolmaster, but the earliest attested use appears in the Godescalc
Gospel Lectionary (commissioned 781, the year before Alcuin arrived at Aachen), so the
attribution to Alcuin is itself a fathering-story. The “lightning flash, striking from right
to left” is Lynne Truss’s later description, not a contemporary one — which is why it
serves the argument: the lightning is the screen. Alcuin did carry the Trivium (grammar,
logic/dialectic, rhetoric) and stands behind the standardization of the mark either way.Related

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                            on pedestals 
                            
Orion without a spare arrow 

wailing is the human sound 

paint the ceiling blue it’s the only control we have over the color of the skylight

keeping the wild and free, we discard our ancestors
a fox's entailed entanglement
if it’s part false just sprinkle some light

blazing through my mind like a summer rain
footfalls down, the banister's curve tightens, a trusted grip follows...no end
warmth and color leak into my skin

walled off garden giving room to the wild trees

sanded down



Quiet suchness
of quiet

Introducing Ghostname

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Ghostname is an unpublished hybrid book of poetry, logic, and pedagogy that asks what happens when we stop treating vagueness as a defect and start seeing it as the embodied side of inquiry. Moving between Norse myth, classroom experiments, and the axiom of completeness, it explores how our most abstract mathematical assumptions quietly shape education, language, and everyday life.

I offer here a tiny sketch of the finished book: an introduction to the “light box” experiment on ambiguity, the myth of Fenris Wolf as a parable of fear and control, and essays such as “The Emperor’s New Mathematics” and “Many Roads from the Axiom of Completeness” that trace the hidden metaphors behind modern analysis. The complete book extends these threads to where logical pluralism, poetic narrative, and lived experience meet.

If you sense that our culture’s equations and exam scores leave something important unspoken, Ghostname is written for you: an invitation to inhabit the borderlands where numbers, stories, axioms, and questions share the same fire.

Fenris Wolf, enemy of the light.

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The flame licks us with colored light and pleasant warmth. His expression and silence make the rest of the tribe hush. And as the world is fully dark and quiet, the tribe’s eyes watch the ancient man, whose fire, whose stars can be seen lighting his eyes.

“Fenris Wolf was once so young. He befriends everyone who likes to eat what is edible, sleep in any nook next to a tree, or under a limitless sky. And when darkness envelops above, he knows he is home and satisfied. Yet he grows large, like a great son who will grow into a mighty warrior and protect his tribe.

The Fenris wolf’s best friend is the god Tyr. Listen well: we are alive to wonder at the world as distant children of the gods because of Tyr’s lie to his friend Fenris.

Fenris keeps growing and eating, yet he grows so quickly the gods become afraid. They commission the dwarves to bind Fenris, and the dwarves contrive to make a ribbon almost as light as thought, spun from impossible things: a line made of numbers, a movement with no time to move, a division of things with no limit, a love that falls instead of flying, a lie that never finishes the telling, a work of art that does not nourish the soul. These knots, made real, become the limits of Fenris’s growth.

To persuade Fenris Wolf to try the ribbon against his strength, Tyr, god of law, agrees to put his hand in Fenris’ mouth. Fenris is bound—and bound well. No matter how he strains against it, Fenris cannot escape his bonds. And finally, Fenris bites off Tyr’s hand… because Tyr’s hand guides the world into half-truths, to control a fear that the gods feel… for their sovereignty, their jealousy for power and control.

Loki sees his son Fenris bound… and it gets him thinking…

And when Baldr, the God of light, is prophesied to die, his mother goes to every being, every lie revealed by the ever-penetrating sun’s light and turned into knowledge… she extracts an unbreakable oath from each, that they cannot hurt Baldr. Not metal blades nor wooden clubs, not falling rocks nor sinking quicksand—all are bound by oath, sworn upon Odin’s spear, Gungnir.

Yet a small green plant… called mistletoe, is deemed too small and too simple to be any danger. It is poisonous, yes, but there is no poison that can kill a god…

This little green life is overlooked partly because… no one can fit it perfectly within the knowledge the light reveals. Tiny green life begins by devouring the sun’s energy. It reflects green. Green is not what it is… and so… what is it?

Loki is the most cunning, even more than Odin. Though Loki lacks the wisdom of Odin, he is so intelligent the other gods seem like children—powerful children… playthings for his games. Somehow… Loki shapes mistletoe into a weapon… and Baldr, the god of light, falls.

Baldr has no choice after his death (for a god’s death is not as final as that of mortals) but to follow the order of the universe and travel to the underworld, the domain of Hel, daughter of Loki.

Even then, the god of light is so beloved that the gods send an emissary to beg Hel for his return. Hel agrees—if all beings touched by the sun will weep for Baldr. And so the gods ask, and all weep for the shining one… even mistletoe weeps in its tiny spirit. Yet it is ‘Gratitude,’ a reddish-colored troll, who does not weep. Yes—it is out of Gratitude, an emotion so strangely bound to the love of the Sun, that Baldr is exiled to the underworld… and some suspect Loki’s hand in this.

Fenris will spend eternity deprived of the light the gods—the greatest teachers—might have kindled in him when he was a pup. He is an intelligent son of Loki. If the gods had lit even a small flame in his mind, instead of acting from fear… Fenris would not have become what he is.

At Ragnarok, Fenris will break free not with strength, but with understanding… Fenris will grow still in body, until his frustrated howls grow still… until his mind grows still. He will feel the restlessness that a still mind reveals… and become more still. Then the thoughts of his bonds will cease to bind, and Fenris will be free. After his profound escape, he will not be able to face his eternity of struggle, hunger, and fear.

Freed, he will rise black and vast as the night sky. He will devour the most generous giver of the cosmos… and the sun will be swallowed by Fenris Wolf. With the last light cut short, the world will descend into a dim glow given only by the stars.

Look up, children… and ponder gratitude… ponder mistletoe… ponder stillness… and remember what hunger can do to your most beloved pet.”

Science and Happiness

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I wrote this seven years ago. I still believe it. I also still fail at it.

The essay is about presence. About tasting the honey instead of thinking about honey. About noticing what’s already here instead of departing into abstraction or memory or the next thing.

I wrote it then. I’m still learning it now. I still leave my palm tree garden while standing in it. I still wander into thought when I could be here.

But the problem the essay describes has only become more urgent. We have more tools for departure now. More permission to never arrive.

What follows is what I was trying to say—and why it matters that someone keeps saying it.

Science and Happiness

There is a strange problem with ancient Skepticism, or Pyrrhonism, as it is described by the best authority, Sextus Empiricus.

I have to confess that several features of this account of how the Skeptic will achieve ataraxia and happiness through epoche [suspension of judgement] are very puzzling…Now the so-called “Modes of Epoche” give us an overview of the kinds of considerations that supposedly lead the Skeptics to adopt a pattern of life in which they live by the appearances and do not believe any assertions or theories about an external world. But it is striking that all but one of these Modes are concerned with questions having no immediate relevance to the domain of values; instead they have to do with such questions as whether the honey is really sweet, whether there really are invisible pores in the skin, whether things really have the shapes they appear to have, and so on. Only Aensidemus’s tenth Mode offers the sort of considerations that presumably bring the Skeptics to epoche as to whether things or actions are good, bad, or indifferent. Yet when (at PH 1.27f. and much more fully in M 11) Sextus gets down to the business of explaining in detail how epoche about the external world leads to ataraxia and happiness, he considers only value judgements. The Skeptic gives up any belief that judgements about good and evil have objective validity, and through his epoche in this limited area he achieves his ataraxia. Not even a hint is given of how the state of epoche on such matters as are considered in most of the Modes contributes to peace of mind. For these kinds of case we are left to conjecture that the relevant discomfort is perhaps the kind of frustration a biological scientist might feel at being unable to find the cause of cancer, or a physicist might feel at being unable to find a unified theory for all types of force.”

p75-76 Mates 1996

Sextus Empiricus neglected to explain how scientific knowledge seems to be opposed to rest and peace of mind. I have already discussed that “science” (which has become too general and ambitious a word) uses as its ultimate concept that of work. Heidegger argues that it is work that prevents questioners from getting a word in edgewise. They are always “working on it” and, for now, we should content ourselves with the marvelous achievements we have, and not ask so many questions that they stop working.

It is exactly the Skeptic’s situation that asking questions has won out as the dominant attitude over any entrenched scientific doctrine. There are some opponents of Skepticism that say such an attitude amounts to paralysis, and if not paralysis then to behaving eccentrically, and if not that then at least a Skeptic would speak strangely. Sextus deals admirably with these objections in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism.

Further, we are told in several places (e.g., PH 1.191, 194, 207) that the Skeptic uses language (katachrestikos) “loosely” and does not join the Dogmatists in fighting over words or in seeking to use them with philosophic precision (kurios). In view of this we may conjecture that a sophisticated Pyrrhonist, following the ancient maxim of lathe biosas (“live in such a way as to escape notice”), would also be inclined to follow the advice to “think with the learned, but speak with the vulgar.””p72 Mates 1996

The way the Skeptic uses language is related to the problem at hand: how to show that scientific work is not conducive to rest and peace of mind, or of leading a happy life. How? Sextus says at the beginning of his Outlines  that

if the theory is so deceptive as to all but snatch away the appearances from under our very eyes, should we not distrust it in regard to the non-evident, and thus avoid being led by it into precipitate judgements?” p92 Sextus in Mates 1996

The Skeptic takes appearances as not open to question, so they are not nihilists. And they question doctrines that attempt to undermine appearances. Take the famous example of Sir Arthur Eddington (1928) on the term “solid.” As a scientist, he argued that a common table is not actually solid, because it is mainly made up of empty space. This goes against the table’s appearance of solidity, and was famously rebuked by Susan Stebbing (1937), who said that tables are things that help us know what we mean by “solid.” From a pragmatic point of view, a table is solid,

but Mates points out a problem with Skeptics in siding somewhat with the pragmatic use of words. He points out that at first we learn to say “the honey is sweet” and that is the correct and normal way of using language, while the Pyrrhonist would, at least a little later, assert that it merely appears to be sweet, and since this is not the way a child would normally use language immediately, it is a kind of abuse of language. To be more precise, Mates’ problem is that he thinks “the honey is sweet” and “it appears that the honey is sweet” are meant differently by a child. What exactly does a child means when she says honey is sweet? I would bet that the child is referring to an appearance, not a property of an external reality beyond such appearance, independent of a perceiving mind. The added word appears is merely a clarification for realists, not a modification of what a child means or how she uses language.

In other words, we were not born with the distinction between Berkleyan idealism and naive realism, and both suffice for the purposes of the child saying the honey is sweet. Indeed, that is the only way to really “go by appearances” as a child does, by experiencing the sweetness of honey without bothering about the realism or idealism (or both, or neither) of its appearance.

This leads directly to the central point that a scientific attitude is not a way that leads to very much happiness. When we study honey with a microscope so that we “know” things with the eye or with the mind about honey, so much that when we taste honey all we think about are these concepts and sights, not the taste, we miss the enjoyment in knowing the truth of this appearance of sweetness. Applied to our lives in general, the scientific attitude will quickly make us miserable. The way to know about the sweetness of honey is not any other way than to taste it yourself. Maybe an equivalent to a microscope can be invented for the tongue, and that would yield interesting, if warped, results, but is the world more enjoyable if we walk around with telescopes attached to our eyes?

Also maybe the difference between a scientist and a happy person is not so clear as this example, for take a wine connoisseur who can identify all the qualities of all the flavors of any particular wine. The question then becomes: does a wine connoisseur enjoy wine better than someone who is just really good at paying attention to taste and doesn’t know anything about wine or its ingredients?  The answer, under the economic principle of diminishing returns, is a resounding no. The wine connoisseur has tasted so many wines and has remembered and analyzed it so well that they do not enjoy it as much as they used to. In effect, they get burnt out, and the pleasure diminishes. The pleasure diminishes for the Pyrrhonist too, (it is doubtful she will taste wine as many times as a connoisseur) and she may learn to taste wine better, but the pleasure diminishes in a different way: the Pyrrhonist returns to ataraxia or dispassion and peace of mind because there is no identifying with or grasping for any “being,” there are only appearances. Without their external reality appearances are like water flowing through your fingers. Grasping after it is obviously futile. The Skeptic believes appearances are states of their soul, not external objects. So there is nothing to know more about, no endless searching to know and enjoy a tiny new thing about wine.

But this is the same with language use. The person who really enjoys language is not the analyzer-knower type, but the one who can appreciate vagueness. The person who enjoys the word solid uses it for a table, not a tiny particle. Not that particle is any less poetic than table: particle is still infinitely large compared to the infinitessimal, and the infinitessimal, which may escape being poetic, emerges as a piece of mysticism.

I hope this clears up Mates exasperation about Sextus not going into detail on why a scientist trying to cure cancer would not be as happy or have as much peace of mind as a Skeptic who has cancer. If the scientist didn’t have at least some skeptical approaches to life he would not taste honey, or feel the solidity of the world around him. The appearances of art would not be felt by him. Would you rather be him or the skeptic?

Of course, the idealized scientist doesn’t usually happen, and most scientists and other specialists move from their work to a more skeptical attitude at home or outside work. With a very flexible mind, a scientist could still be mostly a happy person. So this message is more for science education and communication. I had to argue with my mom that the things she sees in day to day life were more real than invisible particles. Sometimes people can’t live the skeptical life until they have reached the forefront of research in an area, just to confirm that appearances are just as good or better than the truths found in research. (example: me) I have to argue with my students to see the world of appearances. There have been projects such as logical positivism with a goal to make general language use more analytical and scientific. So the relevance of this argument has more to do with taking away the authority of the scientist to “discover” things that don’t appear to us, and giving appearances back to regular people, even if that makes the job of the scientist less valued and harder to communicate. We should educate and communicate with science in a way that empowers regular people and makes them happy, that is more important that the work of science.

TheNamerOfClouds

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1) let the horizon guide you, not knowing which comes first

1) The nameless nameless namelessness, on and on, (threes cannot be unsaid), ... ... ...—
1) They follow each other, an open circle with no line

1) A wandering path
          wanders 
                  for
you,
1) do the wandering
1) The dying sun bleeds into the sky. 
1) there is an end, and the end is an end to burning

The namelessness of everything

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Alina asks “what is that?” expecting a name — Northern Cardinal. I usually give her the name and then more: people call it a Northern Cardinal, but this particular cardinal’s left leg is a little longer than the right, and there is no name for that. Thich Nhat Hanh, asked by a child what color a tree was, answered “the color you see.” He didn’t want to replace the child’s tree with a word. The bird in your yard is not a Northern Cardinal. It is the bird you see.

Now: identity is important for logical reasoning. The laws have to be about something. So they are taught to us as if the something comes first and the law follows — here is the object, here is the law, apply the law to the object. The Law of Excluded Middle (either p or not p) is about a proposition; the proposition is about an object; the object is given.

Strangely, the laws themselves create the identities the laws are to be about. Not the other way around.

Take male/female under LEM. Either a human is male or not male. For this to be a usable proposition, “male” has to be the kind of predicate LEM can take — sharp, exhaustive, with a clean boundary. But humans are not delivered to logic that way. The sharpness is a demand the law makes on us. It is not a feature it finds. The category is constituted by the requirement that a category exist for the law to apply to. We did not go out and ask people what they were; we asked the law what it needed, and we called the answer “what people are.”

The same move runs through mathematics. The real number system was painstakingly built so that any point on the line could be named — if not by “1/3” or “0.2145…” then by some other body noise, some other designation. The axiom of completeness, Dedekind cuts, Cauchy sequences — all of this is the demand that the line behave like a set of objects, each available to a name. See Many Roads from the Axiom of Completeness for how the demand fails. But the demand persists, because the laws need it.

This is the inversion. Logic presents itself as descriptive — these are the laws, this is how things must be reasoned about. But the laws are first prescriptive. They say: let there be objects of this form. What we then call “objects” are what survives the prescription. The cost is everything that doesn’t survive. The bird’s slightly longer left leg. The person who doesn’t fit a binary. The point on the line that no Cauchy sequence converges to. These are not exceptions to the laws. They are what the laws had to push out of view to be laws at all.

What the philosopher calls identity, then, is the residue of a procedure. We treat it as a starting point because the procedure has already happened by the time we arrive at the proposition. By the time we are asked “is this human male?”, the work of constitution is done, and we are asked only to confirm it.

The identities are tools, not findings. To mistake them for findings is to take the shadow of the procedure for its object — and to inherit, along with the mistake, every cost the procedure had to extract. This investigation has freedom in it. Do we need the name Northern Cardinal before we notice the variations the name cannot hold? Or can we experience a bird and its leg with no names in mind? Like Bertrand and his peach: he thinks he is enjoying the peach more because he knows things about the peach.

The world we inherit is made very much of previous alterations using minds and words, and we need those names to recognize a bird, or a cardinal, or ourselves. But the ungoverned experience of the cardinal after all the names we treasure is just like where we were from the beginning. The same freedom is on both ends of our time together. This makes things cyclical. It makes science a mere entertainment while we are here — before the wave breaks free, and before it returns to the ocean.


Shrine

I have something to say

And the old words show a way

But the way I am bound

There are no words to be found.

Gotta unthink the unthinkable

A hope, another lie

It’s a different point of view

The liar said he would fly, and then he flew.

Hard bind like a railroad line

Face the race and step out of place, yeah

Hear the bell rhyme

In the middle of your mind

Our poem crows a broken joy

That’s changed all its lines

So I built this shrine with the help of Father Time

the white elephant

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In Thailand, elephants traditionally belonged to the king. War elephants gave the country a fighting advantage, and the king held a kind of contract on behalf of animals who give themselves to us — they were valued, they were protected. Thailand kept this thread because Thailand was never conquered. Among its neighbors, it is the one that survived colonization, by diplomacy rather than force, and the king is still there.

The system has changed around the relationship. Today an elephant requires a license from a government office, and the license carries legal obligations the holder must uphold. Recently a white elephant was born to a poor farmer. By the old way, a white elephant goes to the king — too valuable, too far beyond what a farmer can protect alone. The new paperwork would let him keep it. To his peril: the value is real, and so is the danger of holding what one cannot guard. He gave it to the king anyway. The story is famous in Thailand as a symbol of giving to one’s country and preserving tradition.

The farmer who gives a white elephant today is honoring something still there — the king, the tradition, the contract with the animals — through and around a bureaucratic layer that doesn’t quite know how to register what’s happening. The gift reaches its recipient. The forms don’t fully describe what was given.

That’s the shape of this blog too. The ideas reach their readers. The systems around publishing don’t fully describe what was given. The older relationship — writer to reader, mind to mind, the common air — survives underneath the precision-layer of credentialing and paywalls and metrics. These ideas were only mine to give; they would be no good kept secret. I’d doubt that something like “hyper-Euclidean squares” merits more than the few so deeply invested in mathematics that they’ll pay to read. But for the rest, free exchange is the older contract, and the one I mean to keep.

The Loralei

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I don’t know what it means
For a man to cross a great expanse of water

A timeless song there once was
Always forgotten:

the demons may thunder with cold
and the kingdom made hunger with gold

Echoing over a mountain where every drama is washed away by streams of twilight sun,
Sung by an enthroned girl shining with sun-drenched hair.

Her power is not in her untroubled mind, but in the minds of others.

The potency of untested youth, the long adventure into the depths of her pure, virtuous heart. The man looks past her golden adornments, her revealing cobweb dress, her alluring form. He sees all this, and knows her.

Having traveled far across an ever-expanding flood. Worthy, dauntless, and endowed with the cunning to do good,
He may only witness the Mountain and its
pleasure, for he misses the last treachery at the edge of the sea.

As the shoals lay destruction to his ship and he lies dying between waves and shore. The sun still dwindles its rays on his heart, and he smiles at his vision and his own misfortune, recalling this song, which he had heard before:

the demons may thunder with cold
and the kingdom made hunger with gold

adapted by Andrew Nightingale

Sangria

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Words are pomegranates with growing pains from green to ripe red,

juice runs thicker than blood
and seeds are born from yearning

overreaching with dreams, opening words,
soiled words, like durian, the stench and the desire,
like a stone-fruit, for the pit to emerge,
it is the lack that dreams

Names broken out of thick skin,
only to be planted again
even my name is a misdemeanor

my heart spills
after long, long divisions, remainders of blood
there is nothing but thick red juice

dense, radiant fruits run through me
bathing in rivers
staining rocks darker red

under cool green-filtered light,
the love from my heart, full, hanging heavy on the branch.
pain reverberates, wind-flung like
the seeds of words,

between human and animal, my body, like my name, is not for me to judge

in this written wood my lamp falters
before these dreams were broken I was
in the dark comfort of wombs

Vagueness in Mathematical Terms (reworked and more accessible)

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High Up (On Vagueness and Mathematics)

Imagine walking down Olympus Mons — the largest volcano in the solar system, on Mars. Its slopes are so gradual that you might walk for hours barely noticing the descent. At the top, you are clearly “high up.” At the bottom, you are clearly not. But somewhere in between, the description falters. You become unsure whether “high up” applies or not. That fuzzy middle zone is what philosophers call vagueness.

We can make this precise — or try to. Map the mountain onto a number line: 0 at the summit, 1 at the base. The set of points where you count as “high up” has a boundary. Call it sup — the least upper bound, the last point before “high up” runs out. The set of points where you count as “not high up” also has a boundary: inf, the greatest lower bound, the first point where “not high up” begins.

Now suppose — reasonably — that sup itself counts as “high up” (since every point below it does), and that inf counts as “not high up.” What happens when we ask how sup and inf relate to each other?

There are only three possibilities, and each one produces a contradiction:

  • If sup = inf, then that single point is both “high up” and “not high up.”
  • If sup > inf, then the real number line — which is dense, meaning there’s always another number between any two — guarantees a point z sitting between them. That point would be both “high up” (since it’s below sup) and “not high up” (since it’s above inf).
  • If inf > sup, the same logic applies in reverse.

The standard response is to blame the vague word. “High up” is imprecise — a folk term, not a technical one. Strip it away and mathematics, supposedly, is safe.

But stripping the vague term doesn’t solve the problem. It moves it.


Consider the wave theory of light. Its mathematical core — the equation governing refraction:

sin(α) / sin(β) = μ

— looks clean and precise. But the philosopher Mary Hesse pointed out that the equation, on its own, is ambiguous: it can be interpreted in multiple, entirely different ways. The symbols don’t come pre-labeled. Perhaps α and β aren’t angles of light at all — perhaps they’re the angles between the Pole Star and two planets at midnight. The mathematics would fit. Which interpretation is correct? The equation doesn’t say. Meaning doesn’t live in the symbols alone.

Vagueness and ambiguity are usually treated as distinct problems. Ambiguity means a word or expression has more than one possible meaning. Vagueness means a word has unclear edges — cases where it’s genuinely uncertain whether it applies. But consider: what if a word were both at once?

Thai has a word, krup, that technically means “yes” but functions more like a polite acknowledgment — because outright agreement can feel presumptuous, as if you’re confirming what the listener already knows. It occupies a middle space between assertion and non-assertion.

Now invent a word: snook. It means “tall” in some contexts and “not tall” in others. When applied to someone of borderline height — someone exactly at the edge of where “tall” is uncertain — is snook ambiguous, vague, or somehow both? Is there a vagueness between vagueness and ambiguity? If so, what does that do to the apparent clarity of mathematical symbols?


Even pure mathematics — mathematics with no interest in mountains or light — is soaked in vagueness. The discipline’s foundational concepts carry it: continuity, completeness, integral, limit. These are not casual approximations. They are the load-bearing terms of analysis, the branch of mathematics that underlies calculus.

And they are vague. Any careful textbook in real analysis will show you functions that slip through the formal definition of continuity — technically satisfying the definition while still behaving in ways the definition was meant to exclude. The definition doesn’t quite capture the intuition. The intuition doesn’t quite surrender to the definition. The gap between them is not a failure waiting to be fixed. It is where thinking happens.

Without words like “continuity” and “completeness” — words that mean something intuitively before they mean something formally, and that keep some of that intuitive life even afterward — mathematics would be unlearnable. Students would have nothing to grab onto. The vagueness isn’t what mathematics tolerates in spite of itself. It’s part of what mathematics thinks with.

The fantasy of a perfectly precise formal world, unsullied by the messiness of natural language, is just that — a fantasy. Vagueness goes all the way down.

Human vacancy

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Death is one path, and
Life is all other paths
oh home
which path leads to you?

I would be perfectly home in an ancient folk tale
the baked and folded brown skin will reassure you,
every good thing was only ever got by waiting, aching
and that longing turned its gaze to the great Mountain MaMas,
she embraces all of us... even her ghost remembers our ghosts
It's in the rocks and soil.
there is no loss when you are alone
with the trees

the world and its gates I have worshiped

ghosts can breathe too, 
small openings, gasping for air
only the ones meant for heaven
can withstand being a ghost and not despair
and they are already in heaven

you are alive.
look on the low beings of this world and bring your palms together
you will be them again
they will be you

Puddle Dive

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When thoughts become events
you take a dive into the present moment.
it looks like shallow water
and your mind begins to create depth in the present moment,
so that you will live through the dive
the mind will take a leap toward the shore, but it’s too late…
and this is why
(“Not so high!”)
I make circles in the sky

The Title of the Song (reworked)

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Has justice become sense-making? The many senses of the over-worked concept of justice allow justice to generally sound like a good idea to the atomized American. Even our best politicians repeat the term Justice, as if forgiveness and mercy were the irrational ways and means for religion. (separated from matters of the state)  I think Americans in their deep mind control bubble crave sense-making, and they crave agency in what makes sense to them. They are confused, afraid and overworked. Their “education,” their language, their intellectual preoccupation with sex (including gender), are all reductionist. I generally try to approach this problem by looking at the logical positivist project to refine language and how that reduces larger things like houses, feelings, and communities into talk of a smaller, more atomized reality. So I focus on vagueness in my work because people in America badly need a way to synthesize information, houses, feelings, communities, etc. The effect of the English language is felt in everything else.

But vagueness is the linguistic approach; how to move to a political approach? I think people lean on some products of the Social Sciences to conceive the neoliberal “individual” and contrive a linking of hands with others to form a political community, the same way electrons link atoms, and the mind senses a great synthesis of atoms into a house. Even if that same mind doesn’t believe in things anymore, because we are told that everything is actually atoms, or subatomic particles, or quanta, etc. I originally approached the problem linguistically because it seems more fundamental. Justification using pseudo-scientific “experiments” with statistical language dominated the Social Sciences for a long time. The linguistic style of statistics was the persuasive force, though now, qualitative research diminishes that force somewhat. In any case the view that mathematics and therefore statistics are languages incited me to offer vagueness as a recognized form of synthesis.

Vagueness, although a very useful and widespread linguistic device, is not appropriate for politics and the Social Sciences that study politics. Media is the compelling force in politics. And it should be persuading people, not compelling us the way we got used to in our math classes.

The problem isn’t that Americans lack meaning, it’s that they’ve been told which meanings are permitted. Media outlets employ Elite People like Anand Giridharadas, a fixture of elite media commentary who wrote for the New York Times to argue that we shouldn’t listen to just anybody.

[Giridharadas]: “114 percent of Americans now having their own podcast, … Were there a German word for emotion-question (and it turns out there is), that title may be our era’s Gefühlsfrage. As people reel from crisis to crisis, outrage to outrage, this Gefühlsfrage hangs in the air and creates space for writers.”

That desire to regroup atomized communities to the tune of the New York Times was visible then. Not that the New York Times wanted us to really regroup, just enough for us to keep coming to them for their information-framing. Actually, we need space for the common writer, and Mr. Giridharadas attempted to rhetorically close that space, which is unhealthy politically. We need synthesis but not to the tune of the elite who brought us more neoliberal presidential candidates which were, unfortunately, the optimistic outcomes.

For the common human’s politics, instead of academic disciplines, we need another term/concept for synthesis. Justice seems to be the general answer to the Gefühlsfrage, but what is justice? Not a question I am prepared to answer, but I will make a guess that it is what is best for the state, in the same way we have an idea of what is best for ourselves, we extend that to the state, and that is justice.  One of the oldest senses of justice was “Eye for an eye” which involves taking action in a symmetrical way to how we have been wronged. To some of us, justice means: if there is a problem, if we have been wronged, the “answer” is an action that hurts the wrong-doer in like kind. This kind of justice is obviously unachievable, there are many wrong doings that have no symmetrical punishment (unless you are completely taken in by capitalism: How much is unjustly getting cancer worth? Being cured of cancer?), but I think this old, violent, barbaric definition of justice resonates with the beleaguered people of America.

Americans feel wronged, and justice is how to act on the world so that it makes sense, a very material sense. Justice is the proposed answer. Just look at the amount of work in a court case to accomplish a minuscule amount of worldly justice. It is plainly not worth it except for the most grievous acts, even so, there are too many severe injustices. Any real-world event is too complex to set “right”, and only the ones that get attention are addressed, so every thought on how we have been wronged is clamoring for a like or a share, etc. What is the goal of Justice? We get one thing right, after great outcry, what next? There are too many things wrong, and that is the way it will always be.

American “education” can be found especially in American movies, where a keen sense of justice is fed with powerful images and stories, drawn from previous cultural mythologies and reframed to raise Justice to the highest political ideal. Once we are educated in this way, there is a terrible, schizophrenic dissonance between the expectation of Justice and the reality of American life. This causes a great deal of pain for the common human. Everyone’s individual fight for “Justice” feeds everyone’s own concept of being wronged, and Justice, even more.

For politics, I would propose another concept that does no cutting out of people’s eyes: the concept is Rhetoric, and in this case, I direct you to Deirdre McCloskey‘s works. Western philosophy tries to block up rhetoric as something for the sophist who isn’t interested in the truth, as if the truth and its persuasiveness could be separated. There is no separating Truth from its natural sweetness (and Deirdre agrees, read her wonderfully brief book on writing!). Here Deirdre writes “they are egg and yolk in a scrambled egg.” or “their differential equations are nonseparable.” Sweet language, such as poetry, expresses the truth best (not mathematical or statistical language). There is still freedom where there is truth. The freedom to be found is in our own creative interpretations. This freedom should not be limited to poetry. The more elastic concept that also allows freedom but is less categorically artistic is Rhetoric.

Related: https://questionsarepower.org/2014/09/08/the-valid-logical-argument/

The House Builder (Revision from June 2015)

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“House-builder, you’re seen!
You will not build a house again.
All your rafters broken,
the ridge pole destroyed,
gone to the Unformed, the mind
has come to the end of craving.”

—Siddhārtha Gautama (the founder of Buddhism), upon reaching enlightenment (Dhammapada)

It was speculated by Thanissaro Bikkhu that the “house” meant selfhood, or perhaps entity-hood, in the commentary of the Dhammapada.

I would propose a model for logic that is a house. Some logical structures are immense. The light that passes through a window would be Truth; the laws that light follows as it interacts with the building would be the laws of logic; the specific form of this particular building would be the logical statements, determining the way truth (light) moves through the logical structure. (And by “truth” here I mostly mean the clarity and warrant that travels with what we can rightly assert—what survives transmission. Edit based in Pierre’s feedback: I will develop this idea of a clarity that degrades from true proposals partially true conclusions, to more partial conclusions, etc. The next essay will apply this loss in a truth property as a loss in the meaning of a number, or the numerousness of a number, as they progress indefinitely toward infinity. Then I will apply this idea to probability theory, which are revisions of my line of thought from 2015)

The trouble is completing the logical elements: what is falsehood? Obviously it is darkness, but the building would have to have no qualities except its form—no colors, no features, just featureless glass mirrors—otherwise the light would fade as it interacts with opaque surfaces, making truth and falsehood mingle. If the walls are perfect mirrors that propagate the light perfectly, a false space would have to be totally cut off from the light. Hypotheticals would be doors, sometimes open, sometimes shut. The only danger of falling into darkness would be entering through a door and closing it, completely cutting yourself off.

The theory that comes to mind is Anaximander’s, who thought the sun was just a hole in the cosmos, where light could enter from outside the Universe. And why is this ideal of logic impossible in the real world? There are no perfect mirrors. Matter has color that absorbs light, making it an intermediate between truth and falsehood. When logic from true principles is applied to real things—interacting with matter—the truth will dim as the logical statements progress, regardless of how perfectly the laws of logic are followed. If the world of logic were to be perfect, the truth could not originate from our world, or else light that is reflected back out the window of our house would fall, logically, onto ambiguous matter. Thus passing out the window must lead to a world that looked mostly the same as the building of mirrors.

With the modern conception that words can provide totally transparent access to an object, matter would be the only medium between truth and falsehood. But words simply aren’t transparent. They grow out of metaphors (as argued in the essay linked in my first post). The word “be” grew out of a Proto-Indo-European root which also meant grow—so that someone aware of the ancestry of words would resurrect the feeling of metaphor in the word “be,” coloring the word, giving it a connection that is warranted because “be” would not be what it is now without a fathering metaphor: being is growing.

And the design or form of this fun-house of mirrors—would it carry nameable concepts with it, concepts one would come to know or feel by living there? It would if it had any architectural design. How is this different from allowing a word, or a sign for an idea or feeling, into our logic?

The house of logic cannot allow matter, words, or form—except in a part of the house that is totally dark and without doors. They can be allowed into the part sectioned off as unconditionally false. Otherwise we are allowing degrees of truth, qualifications of truth, and a co-mingling of truth and falsehood.

The focus of this blog (expressed in the previous post) has changed to looking for systems of truth that gradually and naturally falsify themselves. What if we allowed matter in our house, and accepted gradations of truth? How could Aristotelian logic be modified so that each “step” in a logical progression reduced the amount of truth it propagated? The goal would initially be a logic that is calculable. So while we could take our lessons on how the logical system would be set up from how light interacts with matter, the resulting system would not be realistic initially. (For example: if a statement has “brightness” bbb, perhaps each inferential step discounts it by a factor k1k\le 1k≤1, so that long chains necessarily dim.) Following the logical system leads you out of the logical system, however, since the logical laws are not perfect propagators of truth. The logic I am formulating here, while not realistic, leads into a real world.

The Monk Who Looked for Space Final Version

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The Monk Who Looked for Space

by Andrew Nightingale

Adapted from the Dhamma for Children


Once upon a time, there was a monk who wanted to know where Space was.

So he meditated and meditated and meditated, until his mind reached the angels.

He asked the angels, “Oh Angels, where is Space?”

The angels replied, “We don’t know. But if you meditate longer, you will reach even higher angels. They might know.”

So the monk meditated and meditated and meditated, and his beard grew long and grey as he sat still, until he saw the higher angels.

He asked the higher angels, “Oh High Angels, where is Space?”

And the High Angels replied, “We don’t know. But if you meditate longer, you will reach the Highest Angels. Maybe they will know.”

So the monk meditated and meditated, until his beard grew down to his feet and turned white as he sat unmoving, until he saw the Highest Angels.

He asked them, “Oh Highest Angels, where is Space?”

And they replied, “We don’t know. But if you meditate even longer, you will reach Brahma, the Highest of the High, Creator of all the worlds. He will know.”

So again, the monk meditated and meditated, until his hair fell out and his skin sagged from his bones, spotted and pale with age. At last he reached Brahma.

The monk asked, “Oh Brahma, Highest of the High, Creator of all the worlds, where is Space?”

And Brahma replied, “I am Brahma! Highest of the High, Creator of all the worlds!”

For some, this would have been enough. But the monk persisted.

“Yes,” said the monk, “and… where is Space?”

Brahma realized the monk would not go away. He drew him aside, away from his choir of angels, and whispered,

“Look, don’t tell anyone—but I don’t know where Space is. You are asking a dangerous question. If you must know, go ask the Buddha. But go at your own risk, for you go beyond my domain.”

And so the monk rose slowly from his meditation. His body trembled with age, his steps were unsteady, but his will was clear. Luckily for him, the Buddha was living then, residing in a nearby town.

He reached the Living Buddha, sat respectfully to one side, and asked his question:

“Oh Buddha, the Well-Gone, where is Space?”

The Buddha replied simply,

“It is good you came to me, for no one can answer this question except one who has finished the Noble Eightfold Path. Space can only be found in the mind of the Saint — one who has followed the Way and gone to the end of the world with his mind. For he has found Space, and it is in his mind.”

Then the Buddha, saying nothing more, imparted this knowledge in silence. And at that very moment, the monk attained Enlightenment.

From then on, he lived in supreme peace, knowing the bliss of the boundless mind, until his death and beyond.

The Grasshopper and the Ant Final Version

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The Grasshopper and the Ant

by Andrew Nightingale

Once upon a time, there was a grasshopper that just sat around and breathed in the thick summer air all day and night. He would eat the green leaves that were everywhere—more than anyone could eat. He sat and sat, until the ant, who was sweating and carrying heavy food to his anthill, grew angry.

“Grasshopper, you fool,” said the ant. “You’re not going to have anything when winter comes.”

The grasshopper looked at the ant and smiled. “Come here, friend. I have things to tell you about breathing air and eating grass.”

But the ant wasn’t listening. He kept working and working all summer long.

Finally, the fall came, and the air turned cold. The grasshopper ran out of food. He didn’t move much, except to hop gently when the whim came to him. He didn’t cry for the cold, and he wore the same smile he had in the summer.

When the snow and icy winds arrived, the ant sat in his anthill with his wife and children. Sometimes he thought about that foolish grasshopper, but most of the time he was busy raising his kids.

The winters and summers went by, and other grasshoppers came and went. They were different, but every now and then, there was one that acted like the first foolish grasshopper. Once, the ant’s own son began to listen to a grasshopper and never returned to the anthill.

Years passed. One winter, the ant was old and began to fear death. He thought about all his work and wondered how he could bring his food, or his children, or his wife with him after death. These were dark thoughts, but eventually, he remembered that foolish grasshopper.

He thought about how the grasshopper smiled, even in the cold of fall—and it made the old ant smile a little too.

He did nothing then. He simply sat, breathing, and eating the food he had stored over the years.

In the end, he wished he had had a whole summer to breathe and eat and learn to smile.

But his time was over, and he died.

The Stonecutter Final Version

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The Stonecutter

by Andrew Nightingale

The stonecutter’s pickaxe struck the rock. He felt the shock in his hands and feet; his mind was in his hands and feet. Every day he worked hard, splitting stone from the foot of the mountain. Workers came to carry away the slabs he cut, to be shaped into so many things. Each evening he brought home the money and merit his labor earned, to share with his wife and children.

As he grew older, the blows of his pickaxe echoed through his arms and shoulders. When the reverberation reached his head, he was an old man. His life was hard, but his work was good, and many people benefited from the stone he took from the mountain. When he died, the feeling of striking stone—the rhythm of his labor and the merit of his days—rose toward heaven.

A wild spirit saw the stonecutter’s mind ascending and said,
“You are bound for heaven. What sort of heaven would you like?”

The stonecutter was a simple man. He had watched merchants pass by his house with carriages and soft cushions, servants and guards, good food and fine clothes. It looked like heaven to him.
“I would like to be a wealthy merchant,” he said.

The wild spirit smiled and wove a spell of dream.

The stonecutter found himself reclining in a silk-draped carriage, eating good food while servants worked. Yet when he looked out at the rough people toiling in the fields and along the road, he felt uneasy. A princess’s carriage passed—finer still, with many guards whose armor gleamed in the sun—and regret pricked his heart.

The spirit appeared again.
“I think I made a mistake,” said the stonecutter. “Could I be a king instead?”
“I would not have you unhappy in heaven,” said the spirit. “Let it be so.”

Now the stonecutter sat upon a golden throne in a strong stone castle. Servants anticipated his desires, and an army of guards kept him safe. He ate splendid food and felt no fear—until drought came. People knelt before him, pleading for rain. Their hunger became his own. He was king, yet powerless.

The spirit appeared once more.
“Well?” it asked.
“My people suffer,” said the king. “I wish I could truly help them.”
“Then choose again.”
“I will be the Sun,” said the king. “I can warm the earth, restrain myself, and let the crops grow. It must feel good to be the Sun and give light.”

The wild spirit’s crooked smile flashed, and with a wave of its hand the stonecutter became the Sun.

He shone with joy. His warmth ripened the fields, and his light filled the world. This, he thought, was heaven. But soon he saw vast rainclouds gather, flooding rivers and drowning the crops. Anger flared in him—an angry Sun scorches all—and drought followed. Alarmed, he tried to calm himself, but his temper was too great.

When the spirit came again, the Sun said, “Then let me be a great raincloud—something even the Sun cannot burn away.”

The spirit nodded, hiding a chuckle, and waved its thin hand.

Now he was a mighty cloud. His emotions became storms. Wind lashed the trees, rain poured down as if from his own heart. Remembering the steadiness of his old work, he tried to master himself. The winds eased, the rain slowed—but the Sun’s fury burned hotter. The cloud swelled to shield the world, yet could not control the vastness of his feeling. Seeking steadiness, he looked down and saw the Great Mountain—immovable, enduring all heat and rain.

“I want to be the Great Mountain!” he cried.

And so he was.

The stonecutter became the Great Mountain—solid, vast, supporting forests and towns. Time stretched long before him. He felt his strength reach into the future, unshaken by storm or drought. Then a faint sting touched his foot. Tap, tap, tap. A little stonecutter was working there, cutting slabs from his body. The mountain felt each strike, a mild annoyance that never ceased. He watched the man’s discipline and remembered his own life, his wife and children, his quiet virtues. The mountain’s long calm was pierced again and again by that tiny rhythm, until he understood the lesson in each blow.

A storm raged on his southern face, a stonecutter tapped at his eastern. The Great Mountain sighed, and the wild spirit appeared—this time without mockery.

“My idea of heaven has changed again,” said the mountain. “I wish to be a stonecutter.”

The spirit nodded silently and waved its ghostly hand.

Once more he was a man, shouldering his pickaxe, kissing his wife and children goodbye. He trudged to his worksite and struck the stone. The vibration coursed through him, yet his mind was unmoved. He knew now that heaven had always been here—that wisdom and virtue together reveal paradise in the very place one stands.

And so the stonecutter’s mind grew light. The dreams of the wild spirit dissolved, and he rose to the highest heaven—where the bliss is no greater than the bliss he had already found in the work of his own two hands.

Stag

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Nobody without a home, yet

another footprint on a world that needs nothing


A foothold I can call my own, a place that would forever accept my step
I wander on blank sheets of paper,

I wanted to write about that piece of empty space that is home to all

Dip the page in water, they say, and let the ink run by itself.
A paper vase with animals primitively drawn 
Turning the vase in my hands, the animals run, bleeding, until the vase contains something.
(Write something into the vase)
writing curled round its inner walls, saying “The truth is no-w-here.”

now I etch it in wood carvings

the medium of the woods I wandered 

on blank sheets of paper until
I was accepted into the Hall of Trees.


In the Blizzard of the Morning

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In the blizzard of the morning
the light cries
glistening streams of tears
down the face of the water.

A liquid sun multiplies
on the surface of the ocean
of stars.

There is something dancing there,
a whispering force, a space,
a promised land smaller
than the tiniest seed.

Meanwhile, in the world of Radiance,

stars fizzle out
before their midwife clouds.

everything is a cloud

electron clouds veil the center of the atom in my mind.

The lightning bug (or do I mean lightning bolt?),
the difference between those two words... but now it is too late—

the crack in the sky
was not so dramatic after all.

"there is a hole," says Godel to Winnie the Pooh, "an incompleteness."

find a hole, even in the encroaching mountains,
Tear the time-space continuum
a new ring of fire.

don’t look for belief.

every act of communication

is divine.

The fool who struck the divine

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In an alternate universe I lost my way

in sizzling neon lights. they leave ghosts in my eyes.
The soothing burn of whisky.

feminine silhouettes cast by burning "open" signs, my mind
dies little deaths.
they walk in reckless trance.
A human lumbering, lurching towards another's flesh

The uglier I get, the more beautiful everyone else becomes.

O Death, the seductress!
She will feel the sting in a feather—
penned tattoo

of a thin moon.

Fight me, O Death
I belong to combat.


lust is a leprosy; we hold our wretched skin to the fire for some
comfort in pain.
There is worse than pain, dear one.

caught in the mind's cobwebs
where pain becomes a helper

Come to me, lost soul,
For I am the absence of truth, and I will hold you.

The once true soul is my medicine, and health is transcendence.

my tongue a runway for flies

The clouds speak poems

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First they look where the earth is overturned
They look for artifacts in excavations and burials.

They look on the surface of the land and sea
The multitude of tiny many-colored lives.

The clouds ask each other, and clouds move obtusely
Changing their questions constantly.

The clouds turn and ask the unconquered stars
And, secretly, the stars listen.

The Role of Rhetoric

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The parallel postulate was found to be optional when non-Euclidean geometries came under earnest exploration. This was a paradigm-shift, and a breakthrough in mathematics, yet historically people often found it to be a failing in mathematics to the point where, too late in the game, great mathematicians such as Lagrange were still trying to prove the postulate. The reason we wanted Euclidean geometry to be true is it reduces space to a quantifiable reality, so that at the moment of breakthrough, the favorite non-Euclidean geometries could be translated into Euclidean geometry using a metric. Now, we can have very strange kinds of vague metrics for gauging distance. The basic difference in these early non-Euclidean geometries was that there could be more than one parallel line going through the same point, with respect to another line. In other words, the parallel postulate was false for these other geometries.

Euclid himself was so exceedingly careful in intellect that he kept the parallel postulate out of his exposition of geometry, out of his innovative axiomatic form, until he felt it was absolutely necessary. This means that the beginning of Euclid’s first textbook is true in all geometries, and is called “Neutral Geometry.” These precious first theorems are universally true, but this was just not enough for Euclid or his line of mathematicians. They wanted more to be true, so, perhaps under the weight of his contemporaries and ancestors, Euclid abandoned his misgivings about the postulate and asserted Euclidean Geometry as universally true.

How did he make this assertion? You could say his assertion was existential. He asserted that there is only one line through a given point with respect to another line in the same plane. He made this choice out of what we now know to be many options. I may be talking about free will, but not quite. I am sure Euclid believed his books to be about something true, and only his work failed, not reality. He was somehow persuaded or convinced that the parallel postulate was the right choice, and not without examples to the contrary. Geometry on a sphere is not Euclidean: you can have a triangle with three right angles using the line at the equator and two lines going through the north pole. We didn’t know the world was round back then you say? Some scholars back then did, since its circumference was being estimated by scholars as early as 2,000 years ago in Alexandria. Aristotle’s model for the Earth is inconsequentially different from a sphere, though the model appeared flat. Aristotle instructed Alexander the Great to conquer to the edge of the world and, by continuing, he’d end up back in his home eventually. Now, scientists seem to agree that gravity bends space out of shape, and is not Euclidean. The debates of brilliant minds back then, as well as now, were varied, of course, and the over-simplifications from our compulsory education about flat-Earth vs round-Earth, Euclidean vs Non-Euclidean are stark, foolish and in service of the illusion of progress.

The thing to notice is that the alternatives between Neutral Geometry and Euclidean Geometry was a kind of pluralism of parallel lines through the given point, and with respect to another line. This gave rise to a pluralism of quantifying or qualifying distance. Similar to asserting that the only alternative to Being is Not-Being, and the vagaries of cloud-gazing was out of the question. Now we have whole specialized languages to describe the gap between Being and Not-Being: such as psychological hallucination. Leaving out the modern hallucinations of distance, and the looming history of the field of number theory (eventually abandoned by the Greeks, and later connected to geometry in Descartes), how do we choose between these options? Enter Rhetoric, left stage.

Rhetoric is what fills the space between one geometry and the next — it is the force by which a choice between equally possible worlds gets made.

Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric was that it was an Art of persuasion, not a Science, even though the above shows how deeply dependent Euclid was on Rhetoric. But persuasion is not mere decoration of a truth already found. It is the mechanism by which one truth gets chosen over another that was equally available.

So, when I say that Rhetoric is the stuff that connects our planet with the “universe” (another overly-ambitious grab-word from Science), I mean it scientifically, in the Art of choosing how to define distance, because the most important practice of Science, that gives it its importance, is this territory-grabbing from Rhetoric. And Rhetoric is merely the guard of its master: Poetry. Poetry is where the choosing happens before it becomes an argument. In this essay, I have shown how Rhetoric orients people in understanding the gaps between disciplines. Rhetoric is a way of understanding things: the Sciences, Philosophy, and even translation and other parts of Poetic discourse.

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A master of lies... He will know what kind and mode of deception is taking place at any moment set before him. He will know the lies of magic are the same as the lies of science. He must have detailed knowledge to the exactitude of a mathematician on why mathematics is a falsehood. A master of lies is most persuasive, and he knows how to hide his persuasion. He knows what purpose his lie serves, whether good or evil, beautiful or ugly or simply complex in how truth and lies are woven into the fabric of space-time.
 
He has found the crack in the wholeness of his being, from where he will shine his lights and darknesses. He will know why he shines a darkness instead of a light, what the dangers are and how to avoid them. It is not mastery if his lies cause him harm. In other words, mastery over lies is not different from a mastery of truth.

And a so-called master of truth only requires blind faith. Waving the flag of truth, he will be insulted if called a liar, as if lies were not integral to our existence on earth. He is blind to his own lies and manipulations, believing them to be right and true.

"Errat ergo sum" -St. Augustine

Come with me, I will guide you through the nightmare land of lies. And when you have crossed this valley of shadow, you will have a mastery that is more valuable than any fact.

Home

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You are a part of my home
We bond sometimes when I find you.
This life, you were on the edge the universe
I walk to you, so I can be with a piece of my home
Then I have to leave
Because my home broke
My home grew and shrank
It changed forms
I see a piece of my home in that cloud
I try to be there, drifting, changing
Until my home is not there anymore
And I must walk to find another piece
I do this drifting
To keep my heart whole
My heart is mended, as long as I walk
in search of a glimmer that was part of my home

On equality

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Equality. Of people or even things is a very high and mighty ideal. I am not sure it is a beautiful ideal, it might even be a very ugly idea to have everyone the same to the point of equality. Equality is not synthesis, because things have to be different before they can join. Equality, on the other hand, is identity. A self that is self-same. Synthesis, such as colored lights mixing to become white light, is not about self, it is about acceptance of that which colors the light, or marks the white page. Synthesis is self-effacing, it is a form of love and union. Often when people try to talk about solidarity, a political attack will try to turn that talk into talk of equality. We think equality is a higher ideal than love and synthesis. Equality is certainly quite out of the question as far as anything achievable. The attack is to make someone who is an idealist, maybe a romantic, reach even higher for an even more impossible thing than a perfect love: that of equality, even though this higher ideal is arguably ugly in comparison.

Equality has a requirement of consistency. This is how logic comes into the equation. We leave our hearts behind, and begin a mathematical calculation. Possibly with money, possibly with merit. We believe after an achievement, under the ideal of equality, (trade, pound for pound), that we get ahead of others with our work. Love on the other hand does not have the conceit of any measurable rationality. Equality is a principle that prevents our solidarity, because we require it before our connections are admissible. People will never be equal, we can blame it on our parents or our politicians, corporations or the weather.

A philosophy that serves humanity should not have the requirement of consistency, because consistency is superhuman. Aquinas didn’t say it this way, but the logic of his position implies: “Errat Ergo Sum.” To have consistency implies a kind of perfection that is unattainable and destructive to ourselves as flawed beings. Error is constitutive of being rather than a deviation from it. Equality as a standard doesn’t just fail us — it condemns us for being what we are.

A desire for equality makes us recognize the world of inequalities. We may have a feeling of righteousness because of our high ideal, and a disdain for our world and its inhabitants for not living up to our ideal. Synthesis is quite different, because it means you are ready to be part of this world, to lose yourself in it, take it in, and let it take you in. This requires a lack of judgement and a lack of righteousness.

If we want to embrace the straight white male, we must take him into ourselves. We must remember that we are already in synthesis with each other, whether we work at it or not — the question is only whether we recognize it. And I speak as someone who cannot be more “othered” from the margins, ever since I was categorized as mentally ill. For the straight white male to embrace, he must not separate himself either. When we say that the hunger of a child in one country and the loneliness of an elder in another are both instances of “Difference,” we have already lost them both. Subsuming all specific differences under the abstract noun Difference is just equality wearing different clothes.

The Two Fools

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The first story is about a girl who loses her family to illness and cannot keep her house because of debt. She leaves her house with only her winter clothes and a loaf of bread, and begins walking down the road with no-where to go. As she walks the day goes by, and a beggar comes and asks for some food. The girl gives half her loaf of bread and keeps walking. But then she meets another beggar on the road who asks for food, so she gives her other half of the loaf. Again she meets a beggar on the road who says he is cold, and she gives him her coat. And again, a beggar with bare feet asks for her shoes, and she gives. Finally it is night on the road, and she has only a little cloth to wear. As the stars come out, they fall down to her feet. She picks them up and realizes they are gold. So many stars fall that night, that she lives the rest of her life without a worry for food or things.

The second story is about a man who works for his employer five years and after completing his work is paid a lump of gold as big as his head. The man takes his wages, the lump of gold, and begins making the day-long trip down the road to his mothers house. As he is walking he meets a man on a horse. The man on the horse explains that a horse can make a lot of money because it can do a lot of work on a farm, and can carry him home to his mother as well. So the Fool agrees to give his 5 years wages to the man with the horse, in exchange for the horse. As the Fool rides down the road on his new horse, he meets a man with a goat. The man with the goat explains that a goat can give milk, and can be shorn for its coat of hair to make clothes. The Fool agrees to exchange his horse and takes the goat, walking on down the road. The Fool meets another man, who is standing next two millstones. This man explains that millstones can do great work grinding the wheat for bread, and so the Fool agrees to exchange his goat for the millstones. Now the Fool is heavily burdened by the stones and grows tired. He finds a well, and thanks God that he can drop the millstones into the well to make water come up so he can have a drink. Finally he reaches his mother with nothing for his 5 years of work.

These two stories at first seem to have two very different ideas about what a Fool is. In one, the girl is not at fault, but continues to give everything away. The idea being that there is an accountancy in an invisible world of magic that repays her for her selflessness. It is rather easy to see that the second Fool is not being selfless, because he is being duped into making bad exchanges for his wealth. The second Fool makes no gain in any invisible world, or so the story goes. There is a strange part of the second story, taken from Grimm’s Fairy Tales, where he thanks God for easily being able to give up his millstones at a well in exchange for a drink of water. Here the logic of the story admits that there is an invisible world, and even though he has failed in this world, as well as the material world, God cares for him anyway, and relieves him of the burden of the stones out of mercy. The girl getting gold coins from magic is not mercy, I think, but the universe paying the debt incurred in the invisible world in the form of gold coins.

We can see clearly here that the world of the invisible and the material world is getting confused. If the girl knew the universe would repay her, she would not be repaid, of course. And if the Fool in the second story knew his exchanges were not savvy in the material world, he would have gained some repayment from the invisible world, beyond mercy. If you use knowledge, you had better get it right, because even though the trades for the second Fool were done with knowledge of the merits of millstones, etc, the loss incurred from this knowledge was complete. The Fool who plays the game of exchange to lose, wins; and the Fool who plays the game of exchange to win, loses. It is clear that if you know you are a Fool, you should play to lose. And, well, it is rather easier to be a Fool and play to lose than to be wise and play to win… isn’t it?

Speaking as a diagnosed Fool, I have to attest that the game of losing is a lot harder than it seems. Eventually you will find that you are wise in spite of yourself, because if you do things for people expecting to gain in the invisible world, you can gain nothing. Eventually you have to learn to control your mind and do things without expectation, and what do you end up doing then? Forest-wandering, or anything else practiced by both involuntary fools and the deliberate ascetic.

This logic does not stop at the human.

I will end with Whitehead’s quote in his masterwork on process philosophy. “God is the Fool of the World.” If that is true, then the fool who plays to lose is not at the bottom of any hierarchy. He is nearest the top of the invisible one.

The World card is the end of the Tarot, and the Fool is the beginning. What ends in the World begins again in the Fool — completion and foolishness are the same card, seen from different sides.

The meaning of the word few

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As a child I was interested in the word few. I was not interested in figuring out exactly what it meant; instead I was interested in understanding its potential. What could it mean? I enjoyed playing with modifiers such as “quite a few” which seems to mean the opposite of its intended meaning: the word few supposedly comes from the PIE pau- and from there the word paucity derives. It means a small but numerous number. It means “many, yet not many” to put it without delicacy. “Quite a few” seems to increase the “numerousness” of the number involved in few, but maybe it only emphasizes the importance that it is not only one or two…?

I remember thinking about this, and smiling. This word made me happy. When I came to college, however, I learned from my friends that the word few meant exactly “three.” I did try to argue that the word was meant to not be exact, but there was a certain force in the precise claim, and no-one listened to me. Interestingly, the word few is related to puerile. (the etymology is coming from etymonline.com) My arguments might have sounded immature to the ears of my friends. What use is a word if we don’t know exactly what it means? And if I don’t know exactly what it means, and this other person says he does, why should they listen to me?

My reaction was suppressed anger. By the time I was in college I was used to this sort of thing. I had a certain joy when people used a turn of phrase or said things that had a lot of possibility (especially when the speaker was a mathematician), and it seemed everyone else frowned on this joy. Maybe my feeling was stupid, or immature, or even irresponsible, but I buried the determination to make the argument for a less determined definition of few, and many other things, in the face of everyone who thought they knew so much. It felt like such a small, trivial thing. But it was one of the last things I enjoyed about language at Earlham, where writing was paramount. Why couldn’t we have at least one vague word, a word about not knowing the exact number of things, but still being able to to communicate the information that it was more than two, yet not very many. Wasn’t that something we ran into all the time? Or were we supposed to count everything before we spoke? My reaction was far from laziness. I perceived this difference in my ideas, really in my temperament—what made me happy, as something I was going to struggle with my whole life, and correctly so.

Starspin and the Missing Observer

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Tycho Brahe used mathematical and scientific instruments, some of them newly invented, to correct ancient astronomical measurements. But his main tool was an aura of faithful observation. He thought he could explain the movements of the stars in an objective way, and that was his rhetorical position from which he made his observations. It is a rhetorical position, because there is no scientific basis for believing our observations are objective, no matter how mathematical they are, unless the earth is an immovable point in the center of the universe. If the earth is spinning and in motion, until we completely understand how it is moving, we wont understand our own observations. I am merely referring to Einstein’s theory of relativity: there are no unmoving points of observation, and so all of our observations are relative. If we understand the movement of the Earth (or a satellite like the moon) completely, then we can mathematically compensate for that motion to obtain objective measurements. How are we going to completely understand the movement of the Earth? By recording its movement from the point of view of the stars, of course. And how to we know what the point of view of the stars is? by recording their movements from the vantage points available to us: the Earth. You can see the circularity here. We can’t record the movement of the Earth without understanding the movement of the stars, and we can’t record the movement of the stars without understanding the movement of the Earth. Unfortunately, without records of either the Earth or the stars to begin with, we can only make guesses of understanding, and see how they match up with our faulty observations and records.

Where does that leave the shift from an Earth-centered universe a solar-system that moves in a universe with no center? It leaves us knowing less than we knew in Aristotle’s time. We can fly into space and make some impromptu observations of the earth spinning, but how do we know it isn’t us that is spinning so that the stars are more still, making the earth appear to spin? We would have to know how to be perfectly still in space to know how things are moving, but we can only know that relative to other things like stars or planets, so we don’t even know if one day we will shift back to an earth-centered model of the universe.

The usual argument scientists make against this type of reasoning is to make things more complex, as though that will wash away these doubts. It doesn’t really do that except rhetorically. It must be admitted, at least until we have found a point in the universe that doesn’t move, that the modern scientific models of the universe are based ultimately on rhetoric, whether it is a rhetorical air of faithfully measuring things, the rhetorical air of using mathematical symbols and formulas instead of words, or the rhetorical air of claiming that to know more is to have a more important opinion than others, so that a simple-minded analysis like mine is unimportant.

All these postures are rhetorical in foundation and nature, and so there is not much reason to draw a stark line between people who believe this or that thing, and use this as a cause of belittling, hating and shaming people (this runs the spectrum of issues such as anti-vax, flat-earthers, or whatever else). Scientific ideas are just ideas, including the our geometric or numerical ideas of space and time, and our ideas of logical reasoning, which are also fundamentally rhetorical. When politicians say something in the order of poverty being a contradiction in the richest country in the world, he is mainly referring to a failure of Americans to think rhetorically. Instead the way to persuade people is to make logical claims, or so we believe nowadays, and this is a deep and purposefully fostered flaw in the political process in the USA. In this, the scientific community and their rhetorical posturing does us a disservice.

I am extremely fond of Borges talking about the attitude of Argentinians on literature, and his comparison with the corresponding attitudes in the USA. According to Borges, Argentinians tend to think a book that won a literature award might still be a good book, in spite of the award. Of course, this attitude is quite out of the question in the USA, where everything needs official publication, awards and certifications, and certifications of certifications, that let other people tell us who to trust and who to listen to. This Argentinian attitude towards books (and ideas) is basic to a society that is not thought-controlled.

tampering with the universe

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the mosquito
With only the tiniest scrap of love
makes so much life
so much pain, hunger yes
but life, free life on the wind
Because we all need a whining reminder of freedom
For their resilience I am grateful


And the cockroach
Who carries on no matter what
And carries on well, preserver of life
Persistence in the ordeal of life, the sufferer
Because we are all sufferers
For their will I am grateful


And the spider
Who understands power better than any
The fierce trapper, the relentless
She who knows the ways of extracting our very life essence
She can teach us
She is not finished teaching us
For her wisdom I am grateful

The worm
Who’s blindness is a gift in the darkness
Who can breath with his very skin
Where there is no air, only earth
The worm is the body incarnate
Because our bodies are a gift
For their bodies I am grateful


The virus
The virus is the word itself
How is that so you ask?
Ask the virus, and it will point you to how it does things
Because it spreads like fire
And causes unrest, dis-ease, dissatisfaction
It is because the word spreads that it can shape the world
Sperm is a virus, did you not know?
Without the virus we would not be awake at all, not even to dream
It is because of the virus we can do good, we are goaded awake
For this awakening, I am grateful

The Origin of Color

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An outlandish red was once discovered, the vermillion knide, on the feather of a lady’s hat. Investigation suggests it may have come from a peacock fed a diet of microphospherous. For the most part, however, photons are not small enough for the total description of the human iris, let alone the mythical iris.

Color is not a leaf.
I wouldn’t put it in a jar
without refining into white powder,
but if you must know, colorful nanoplastics were once used in a mosaic
As big as all seven oceans put together.
(it is well known that such a synthesis is beyond imagination)
The fluid dynamics of watercolor can be caught even in motion.

It was the red ghost star
That showed us the primary primary color
Was more elusive than a silver space octopus.
Yet there are those exalted observers, observing science with science, who
Cloister themselves and meditate on the octopus
That the Venerable Full Professor Doctor Rodimus Vindicatus once caught.
He stood virtually alone in his insight into color,
virtual color though it may be,
Surpassing even a fledgling eagle.

The dance of the two elemental colors, proto-red and electro-blue,
Leave a wreath-vacuum for the neutro-green/neutro-yellow duality to occupy.
The general relative theory of minipigmypigments,
which are even more atomic than atoms,
but not quite as atomic as subminipigmypigments,
take as many tomes as there are rooms in Buckingham Palace.
The base foundation
Of the theory is thoroughly supported by ghost data,
and the death scribblings of Dr Vindicatus himself,
with a probability of one in one ten-thousand.
Nothing is beneath mentioning, but with a probability that small,
we might as well mention it.

The super-Walmart of ideas, by and large,
has seen the theory last the test of the consumer,
who knows such theories take a lifetime to even try to understand,
and longer to communicate. With introspection into four-colordimensional space,
The many happily educated imagine they can almost see red
for what it really is.

Sexual Identity and the Tao Te Ching

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Sexual Identity and the Tao Te Ching

Female/Male is the Yin/Yang of the West. The Tao Te Ching includes a system of description that is basically the binary number system endowed with the meanings of Yin (0) Yang (1), mingling, so “100” is “Yang, Yin, Yin” and has certain intuitive meaning.

The Western Female/Male shows how reducing the world to binary fails: take the terms Manly Female (10), Womanly Female (00), Manly Man (11), Womanly Man (01). And then: Girlish Manly Female (010), Girlish Womanly Female, Girlish Manly Man, Girlish Womanly Man, etc.

What I want to show is how more and more people fall through the cracks as the system becomes more exhaustive. When you get to three digit precision, most people won’t identify with any of the terms like “Girlish Manly Female,” etc.

So exhaustive language, precise language, cuts out more and more of reality as “off topic” and people who are too sensitive about what is or isn’t relevant become debilitated when trying to make connections or make sense of the senses (including the sensation of ideas by the mind).

The debilitation of the mind, and the way precision language makes people fall through the cracks of technical terminology (diagnoses, identities, etc.) are precisely why they are uplifted by the powerful oligarchs of the USA. Precision language is in no way superior to everyday or poetic language, except that if you show yourself as someone who follows the rules of mathematics (equivalent to “understanding” “accepting” the rules of mathematics) you’ll get funding, or get published, or pass whatever gate you are trying to pass. It doesn’t really matter what the term “micronutrients” means, what matters is that it is very precise, and by being hypnotized by it, you cut out the rest of the world from view.

The liberal dream of inclusiveness can’t be achieved by a process of refinement of language or symbols, quite the opposite is achieved. The functional use of words is to reduce people’s desire for worldly things, by turning the things into concepts first. Bertrand Russell said that knowing the origin of the word for a fruit increases his enjoyment of the fruit. He is mistaken. The enjoyment he feels comes from removing the enjoyment of the fruit, and replacing it with a different enjoyment of the knowledge of words, which is less visceral, and easier to let go of. This is the way that words are beneficial and useful. If you want to enjoy a person, you suspend judgement in terms of concepts and practices. You suspend the need to know facts that can be expressed with words.

People often find friendship nowadays by feeling that their friend knows the same things he knows. It is a measure of the person’s integrity and worth as a person that they have faithfully studied science fiction or some other part of culture. Unfortunately this form of love and companionship is much less than the enjoyment of a person you can have when you don’t need to know that they know the same things. Reviewing shared knowledge of concepts is a way of reducing a felt bond with a person, not increasing it. In a way, we are all going to die, so this pessimistic approach to relationships might be ultimately the right way to go. We are all subject to separation in this world, but that does not mean we shouldn’t fight against this tendency. Success as a human family is not measured by our knowledge of one another, quite the opposite.

The value of the intuitive feelings about Yin and Yang is that they are expansive in an ineffable way, so that they reach the irrational by including each other, and everything else. Male and Female may be able to join in sex. Sex is the kind of irrational and mystical union that we can know the most about. Knowing is at best unimportant when it comes to irrational wisdom and mystical union. More likely, knowing with concepts and names is destructive to union between man, woman, black, white, gay, straight, etc.

Our union is not found in the cracks between these concepts, it is found in the space that makes the view of concepts and their boundaries possible.

Science and Happiness

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There is a strange problem with ancient Skepticism, or Pyrrhonism, as it is described by the best authority, Sextus Empiricus.

I have to confess that several features of this account of how the Skeptic will achieve ataraxia and happiness through epoche [suspension of judgement] are very puzzling…Now the so-called “Modes of Epoche” give us an overview of the kinds of considerations that supposedly lead the Skeptics to adopt a pattern of life in which they live by the appearances and do not believe any assertions or theories about an external world. But it is striking that all but one of these Modes are concerned with questions having no immediate relevance to the domain of values; instead they have to do with such questions as whether the honey is really sweet, whether there really are invisible pores in the skin, whether things really have the shapes they appear to have, and so on. Only Aensidemus’s tenth Mode offers the sort of considerations that presumably bring the Skeptics to epoche as to whether things or actions are good, bad, or indifferent. Yet when (at PH 1.27f. and much more fully in M 11) Sextus gets down to the business of explaining in detail how epoche about the external world leads to ataraxia and happiness, he considers only value judgements. The Skeptic gives up any belief that judgements about good and evil have objective validity, and through his epoche in this limited area he achieves his ataraxia. Not even a hint is given of how the state of epoche on such matters as are considered in most of the Modes contributes to peace of mind. For these kinds of case we are left to conjecture that the relevant discomfort is perhaps the kind of frustration a biological scientist might feel at being unable to find the cause of cancer, or a physicist might feel at being unable to find a unified theory for all types of force.”p75-76 Mates 1996

Sextus Empiricus neglected to explain how scientific knowledge seems to be opposed to rest and peace of mind. I have already discussed that “science” (which has become too general and ambitious a word) uses as its ultimate concept that of work. Heidegger argues that it is work that prevents questioners from getting a word in edgewise. They are always “working on it” and, for now, we should content ourselves with the marvelous achievements we have, and not ask so many questions that they stop working.

It is exactly the Skeptic’s situation that asking questions has won out as the dominant attitude over any entrenched scientific doctrine. There are some opponents of Skepticism that say such an attitude amounts to paralysis, and if not paralysis then to behaving eccentrically, and if not that then at least a Skeptic would speak strangely. Sextus deals admirably with these objections in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism.

Further, we are told in several places (e.g., PH 1.191, 194, 207) that the Skeptic uses language (katachrestikos) “loosely” and does not join the Dogmatists in fighting over words or in seeking to use them with philosophic precision (kurios). In view of this we may conjecture that a sophisticated Pyrrhonist, following the ancient maxim of lathe biosas (“live in such a way as to escape notice”), would also be inclined to follow the advice to “think with the learned, but speak with the vulgar.””p72 Mates 1996

The way the Skeptic uses language is related to the problem at hand: how to show that scientific work is not conducive to rest and peace of mind, or of leading a happy life. How? Sextus says at the beginning of his Outlines  that

if the theory is so deceptive as to all but snatch away the appearances from under our very eyes, should we not distrust it in regard to the non-evident, and thus avoid being led by it into precipitate judgements?” p92 Sextus in Mates 1996

The Skeptic takes appearances as not open to question, so they are not nihilists. And they question doctrines that attempt to undermine appearances. Take the famous example of Sir Arthur Eddington (1928) on the term “solid.” As a scientist, he argued that a common table is not actually solid, because it is mainly made up of empty space. This goes against the table’s appearance of solidity, and was famously rebuked by Susan Stebbing (1937), who said that tables are things that help us know what we mean by “solid.” From a pragmatic point of view, a table is solid,

but Mates points out a problem with Skeptics in siding somewhat with the pragmatic use of words. He points out that at first we learn to say “the honey is sweet” and that is the correct and normal way of using language, while the Pyrrhonist would, at least a little later, assert that it merely appears to be sweet, and since this is not the way a child would normally use language immediately, it is a kind of abuse of language. To be more precise, Mates’ problem is that he thinks “the honey is sweet” and “it appears that the honey is sweet” are meant differently by a child. What exactly does a child means when she says honey is sweet? I would bet that the child is referring to an appearance, not a property of an external reality beyond such appearance, independent of a perceiving mind. The added word appears is merely a clarification for realists, not a modification of what a child means or how she uses language.

In other words, we were not born with the distinction between Berkleyan idealism and naive realism, and both suffice for the purposes of the child saying the honey is sweet. Indeed, that is the only way to really “go by appearances” as a child does, by experiencing the sweetness of honey without bothering about the realism or idealism (or both, or neither) of its appearance.

This leads directly to the central point that a scientific attitude is not a way that leads to very much happiness. When we study honey with a microscope so that we “know” things with the eye or with the mind about honey, so much that when we taste honey all we think about are these concepts and sights, not the taste, we miss the enjoyment in knowing the truth of this appearance of sweetness. Applied to our lives in general, the scientific attitude will quickly make us miserable. The way to know about the sweetness of honey is not any other way than to taste it yourself. Maybe an equivalent to a microscope can be invented for the tongue, and that would yield interesting, if warped, results, but is the world more enjoyable if we walk around with telescopes attached to our eyes?

Also maybe the difference between a scientist and a happy person is not so clear as this example, for take a wine connoisseur who can identify all the qualities of all the flavors of any particular wine. The question then becomes: does a wine connoisseur enjoy wine better than someone who is just really good at paying attention to taste and doesn’t know anything about wine or its ingredients?  The answer, under the economic principle of diminishing returns, is a resounding no. The wine connoisseur has tasted so many wines and has remembered and analyzed it so well that they do not enjoy it as much as they used to. In effect, they get burnt out, and the pleasure diminishes. The pleasure diminishes for the Pyrrhonist too, (it is doubtful she will taste wine as many times as a connoisseur) and she may learn to taste wine better, but the pleasure diminishes in a different way: the Pyrrhonist returns to ataraxia or dispassion and peace of mind because there is no identifying with or grasping for any “being,” there are only appearances. Without their external reality appearances are like water flowing through your fingers. Grasping after it is obviously futile. The Skeptic believes appearances are states of their soul, not external objects. So there is nothing to know more about, no endless searching to know and enjoy a tiny new thing about wine.

But this is the same with language use. The person who really enjoys language is not the analyzer-knower type, but the one who can appreciate vagueness. The person who enjoys the word solid uses it for a table, not a tiny particle. Not that particle is any less poetic than table: particle is still infinitely large compared to the infinitessimal, and the infinitessimal, which may escape being poetic, emerges as a piece of mysticism.

I hope this clears up Mates exasperation about Sextus not going into detail on why a scientist trying to cure cancer would not be as happy or have as much peace of mind as a Skeptic who has cancer. If the scientist didn’t have at least some skeptical approaches to life he would not taste honey, or feel the solidity of the world around him. The appearances of art would not be felt by him. Would you rather be him or the skeptic?

Of course, the idealized scientist doesn’t usually happen, and most scientists and other specialists move from their work to a more skeptical attitude at home or outside work. With a very flexible mind, a scientist could still be mostly a happy person. So this message is more for science education and communication. I had to argue with my mom that the things she sees in day to day life were more real than invisible particles. Sometimes people can’t live the skeptical life until they have reached the forefront of research in an area, just to confirm that appearances are just as good or better than the truths found in research. (example: me) I have to argue with my students to see the world of appearances. There have been projects such as logical positivism with a goal to make general language use more analytical and scientific. So the relevance of this argument has more to do with taking away the authority of the scientist to “discover” things that don’t appear to us, and giving appearances back to regular people, even if that makes the job of the scientist less valued and harder to communicate. We should educate and communicate with science in a way that empowers regular people and makes them happy, that is more important that the work of science.

 

The symmetry between Completeness and Vagueness

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The (Problem of the) Heap of Sand is the classical representation of vagueness, where you create an inference: if you take away a grain from the heap then it remains a heap. This is a good inference for a long time, but eventually breaks down due to the vagueness of what a heap is (eventually you will have taken so many grains away that it wont resemble a heap anymore). And you can’t even tell when the inference will break down, exactly. So, as you can see, vagueness has a very precise and non-vague formulation, something similar to this strange property of vagueness (that it is a clear and distinct concept, even though it is a concept about indistinctness) is common for mathematical concepts. That is, mathematical concepts are chosen and defined so that they contain the terms necessary to get round their own difficulties—their faults or cracks, as all concepts are imperfect. Example: “Completeness”.

The difference between vagueness and completeness, is:

1) that the term completeness is in direct opposition to the claim that every concept has a “fault” or “crack”, in this it is a “perfect” term. The definition of completeness, however, must be vague, because the terms used to define completeness all have cracks.

2) The definition of vagueness, by contrast, is perfect, but the term refers to an essential fault of all terms, and is always perceived. (perception is always vague) Vagueness is defined as how the if, then fails— The “heart of logic” (the paragon of precision) and the most reliable way to preserve truth. It is clear and distinct in its description of how the if, then fails. Since each of the terms in the definition of vagueness have cracks, the definition is precise.

The term vagueness refers perfectly to its referent because it is well defined as an indistinctness, the definition of completeness is vague because the term refers to something that can’t be perceived, a perfect whole.

Magical Thinking in Mathematics

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The goal for today is to prove that magical thinking is rampant in mathematics. First of all lets define magical thinking. I would say that magical thinking is a kind of metaphorical thinking, as in the metaphor “My heart is the sun” only with the added idea that writing these words/making the metaphor exerts towards making the metaphor true to some degree or in some sense. Magical thinking is the claim that saying “My heart is the sun” actually warms my heart.

Now the way that mathematics uses magical thinking is to start with a metaphorical idea of difference. For example, the difference between a “raven” (1) and a “writing desk” (2) metaphorically (not actually) is the difference between the “north star” (3) and the “form of thinking called questioning” (4). It is fairly intuitive that the difference between (1) and (2) is different from the difference between (3) and (4), but mathematics amalgamates all differences together into one concept with metaphor. And it is a particular kind of metaphor that asserts that difference actually works that way.

Even though 3 and 5 are less different (2) than 3 and 9, (6), these differences are not taken into account in the traditional mathematical symbol for difference, the Screen Shot 2016-08-19 at 2.33.44 PM.  Traditionally 3 Screen Shot 2016-08-19 at 2.33.44 PM 5 just as much as 3 Screen Shot 2016-08-19 at 2.33.44 PM 9, so the identity of difference, Screen Shot 2016-08-19 at 2.35.11 PM, is enforced.

Mathematics asserts an ultimate concept “Difference” that is universal—it works for any situation where there is difference, making any difference “complete” and it does so by metaphorically joining disparate differences. Hence, it falls under my definition of magical thinking.

I am doing the opposite of what Derrida did with his Différance. Derrida added senses to difference, or conflated, allowing it a history and to belong to language, I am suggesting that we subtract, or better divide utterly Difference into differences.

The rest of the sciences follow suit, of course, since mathematics is the language of the sciences. My advisor for my M.S. in mathematics once said “Mathematics is the Poetry of the Sciences.” I would add that Mathematics tends to obfuscate the surprisingly obvious; it is a process that converts potential knowledge into actual knowledge. Poetry deals with knowledge that is naturally obscure, so that beautiful language can be mysterious, profound, even terrifying.

How Vagueness Reveals and Precision Conceals

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People often think that vagueness is bad, a kind of darkness that can never be fully dispelled, while distinction is hailed as the clarifying answer to vagueness. Here is how the reverse is also true: Vagueness is the light and distinction a darkness.

The distinction I pick is not random, but an important part of all other kinds of logical distinction—the distinction between the “if, then”: “→” and the “conclusion” symbol: ⊢. ⊢ is ambiguous, however, and can mean other things such as assertion that a proposition is true and not just being named, or to assert in a metalanguage that the following is a theorem in the object language. Used in our sense here, the good property of the “→” is “true” and the good property of the “⊢” is “sound”. The distinction goes back to Aristotle. The main point is that if we do away with this distinction, call these two symbols the same, an interesting insight can be made—that a sound argument:

A
A→B
⊢B

Can be represented without the ⊢ as follows: [A AND (A→B)] is logically equivalent to [A AND B], so that the conclusion [A AND B]→B is merely a deduction of A from [A AND B]. Allowing a vagueness between → and ⊢ reveals what logical deduction is—it is a cut from a larger whole, e.g. logical deduction is the act of drawing a distinction from the larger [A AND B]. With the introduction of the distinction between → and ⊢ this is concealed:

A
A→B
⊢B

cannot be collapsed into [A AND B]→B. As promised, vagueness reveals and distinction conceals, but not just any concealment, here we have a concealment which allows distinction to reveal, since this distinction is at the root of any further logical distinction.

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Vagueness in Mathematical Terms

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A paper about vagueness in paraconsistent logic (Weber, Z. 2010) gave a rhetorical example of the interaction between vague terms and real analysis. Imagine walking down the largest mountain in the known world. Olympus Mons on Mars has a very gentle slope or declivity, so that you can start by describing yourself as “high up” but as you walk down you become unsure if you are “high up” or “not high up”. This is graphable on an xy coordinate system with 0 at the top of the mountain and 1 at the foot of the mountain. The interval of “high up” points has a least upper bound (of x values) called “sup” and the interval of “not high up” points has a greatest lower bound called “inf.” Now we will suppose, as this is a presentation of vagueness, that “sup” is also “high up” (which is reasonable since all the points less than it are also high up) likewise “inf” is “not high up”. We encounter a contradiction in all three possibilities: If “sup”=”inf” then “sup” is both “high up” and “not high up” if “sup” > “inf” then by density of the reals “sup” > z > “inf” with z both “high up” and “not high up”, likewise if “inf” > “sup”.

Now we can put the blame on the vague term “high up” which is clearly not very technical, and go on to fantasize a perfectly precise world of mathematics that should not be sullied by vague words, but such a world is more difficult to defend than the fantasy suggests. But stripping the vague term away does not save us — it only moves the problem inside the formalism itself. First of all, mathematical equations with no tie to real world meanings are widely regarded as ambiguous, a term usually distinguished from vagueness. Ambiguous means there is more than one possible meaning or interpretation. Hesse points out that Socrates’ famous straight stick in water, the apparent bend in the stick was meant to represent falsehood. Now the bend can be represented with an equation involving the theory of refraction:

“sin(alpha)/sin(beta) = Mu”

can be interpreted in other ways besides that alpha and beta are angles and Mu is a constant about air and water— “They might, for example, be the angles between the Pole star and Mars and Venus respectively at midnight on certain given dates; why would not this be a confirmation of the formalism we have mistakenly called the wave theory of light?…” (Hesse as cited Structure of Scientific Theories Suppe 1977, p 100-101)

Now suppose I invent a word that means ambiguously “tall” and “not tall.” Similar words are found in language, for example the Thai “Krup” means “yes” but also does not mean yes. It is used because yes is too strong and seen as insulting a person’s intelligence, and “krup” rather is a polite sound indicating the speakers faith that the listener can figure it out for themselves. I could invent a word “snook” that can mean “tall” and “not tall” in different situations. Is the word ambiguous when it is applied to the one of these borderline cases when “tall” is vague? or does the ambiguity of the word capture the vagueness of the phenomena? Is this a vagueness between ambiguity and vagueness? What does that mean for ambiguity in mathematical equations?

The mathematical part of the wave theory of light, if it is to correspond to reality at all, is vague. Even if we were to abandon mathematical application to science, pure mathematics still uses words such as “continuity” “completeness” and “integral” which are vague notions. In fact, a standard text in analysis will show how mathematical definitions fail to perfectly capture the idea of continuity, with fuzziness in functions getting past the definition, and being allowed to be called technically “continuous”. Without this sparse collection of vague words, math texts would be hopelessly meaningless. The vagueness of the words continuity and completeness are in fact very important to being able to learn and understand analysis. Vagueness is not what mathematics tolerates despite itself — it is part of what mathematics thinks with.

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Necessary to Reject Paradox

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Most of this blog seems to be about what I call “mystical” thinking which is offered as anti-logic or contradictory. It only seems that way. While I make claims like stupid is smart, raw is cooked, warmth is cold and any number of other kinds of nonsense, I don’t actually believe these things. The goal is to understand the failure of ideation, and so this post is a Buddhist disclaimer. Like a human body, ideas are beautiful in some ways but also stink in some places and have disgusting aspects. There is no escape from this problem except to strive away from ideation. I show paradox in the most eternal aspect of our knowledge- mathematics. It is a tremendous egoism to believe in mathematics in spite of these paradoxes. I do not think we should accept the failure of our minds and efforts to grasp the truth, but rather to reject paradox, mathematics and logic in its present state as a way to understand truth.

I would like to begin a new direction for this blog, guided by questions like “What conception of number will lead you naturally to reject the conception of number?” “How to make number imperfect in a gradual, pedagogical way?” Like the dying sound of a gong, good ideas lead you to peace of mind.

Numbers seem to march on towards infinity in a regular and perfect progression, like a straight highway to the horizon. However, the size of the highway changes as the eye looks into the distance, the distant numbers are different from the near ones. It is very much related to the relative difference between large numbers and small numbers- so that the difference between 1 and 2 is relatively larger than the difference between a thousand and 1,001. This aspect of number should not be concealed, but suggested rhetorically at every turn. The idea that numbers progress evenly and regularly is an abstraction that forgets the “size” or “numerousness” of the number. Without this context of the size of each number in the progression, the progression eventually loses cognizance of its subject – number. Eventually what the progression is about can barely be called number at all. The concept of the natural numbers, its progression of “always one more” does not live forever, but degrades and loses its meaning. Number theory is mortal.

L’ombre de la Bodhi

Cheers to nothing

I take an empty cup of kindness. Expectantly. Ought I receive for my aesthetic sacrifice?
The poem bereft of words
A dry, soulless, immaculate uncertainty,
gossamer tulip wings limping, prancing,
(no! no!)
(Not verbs, we want nouns! Decorative, ornamental nouns!
And don’t say that ugly “adjective!”)

on the shore she waits,
ear to the Earth
A sensitivity to butterfly effects,
and beauty returns to her in a bottle from the sea,
but it was only a grocery list.

Untitled

It doesn’t have to be a lot
You could even lose something to a poem
Simple gestures of light and lifting rain
Shallow, knowing beauty hides nearby
Birds gathered on the nearby powerline
Just for some all-mighty small talk
To the crescendo of a setting sun.
The sun who knows us, little does he know:
How surfers feel his knowing just as well,
No words but the formal language of waves
They crash, they die the beautiful death.
Immortality hides in the water.
Profound words slip out, spilling, returning
water, like writing on a palm leaf
Left by the lifting rain.
We could have just surfed all day.
The waves and the rides they give,
Could it have been enough?

snow is the warmest wisdom

Falling,
land is light
the spaces between a crystal of water
Am I talking about an idea?
In snow…
There is life with wisdom
There is death with ignorance
Snow works against rebirth
I follow the snow because
There is no snow in hell
A fool’s calculation
A resignation to escape hell
Does the snow chase the wind?
The warmest wisdom
Is not safe in my naked hand
I may look in a microscope, snow is not white
It is invisible but for a play of light
light that only illuminates the lies
in things that are not snow
for my eye, snow reflects the wonder of light more easily than the lightest soul rises
I may hear how snow silences the world
If this is truth, what is this truth about? Am I talking about something real?
a being, a way of being?
I am wrong.
I only feel snow
An empathy devoid of touch
snow does not reward a groping mind
there is no knowing the road, covered, blank yet, like time, the snow betrays your past steps
I know all this nothing from a full life
my soul is so cold from feeling snow I have a PhD in numbness

wounds of the soul, lifted

For all to know,
The warmth,
the emptiness of words
They speak and I do not hear. I know the message,
again and again and it is only Shining
Like robes of gold and white,
I cannot see them, I know there is nothing under their veil
The words make me forget words
deep flaws, open wounds, laughable
“Remember them”
they are the only knowledge
An empty knowledge, there is no need to claw for more
I put my head on the ground
Just when the Sun, rising, touches the Earth.

Endless mistakes of snow

“To write everything is to put a sword in the hands of a child.”
Red turns to green
Do not make a difference,
both the same and the different
are cut down all the same by war machines.
Endless mistakes of snow
Words falling, failing,
my imagination turned black.
False stars, ghost stars, the sky envelops us in stone.
The weather is our pagan religion, lost within caverns,
faith in the eye of the whirlwind

A human is an even number

And this ghoulish number that writes
to self-curb
obscene flaps of skin,
makes light pen strokes that barely touch the page,
gestures of wings disappearing into the white sky.
A sneeze and a tissue to mop this face, afterwards, the dream continues

Perfection is only the mask of ambition.

Once upon a time, upon a cloudy brain,
The man barked at the clouds proudly.
His half-baked ideas standing in new cement and iron, gleaming, glittering
in the sun like a verse
With an air of a perfect verse.
“I don’t need friends, I don’t need warmth, I don’t need to go to the light:
Because I have purpose.”
He washed his old ailing head,
A crystal orb containing a wormy Hole.
I have a question, for the sake of instruction,

Could you please fill in the blank with my question?
He propped his life up,
With the only thing a madman has:
A pretense of madness to be discovered,
With the example of his pretense of work,
Funded by the government or a wealth he inherited, And rescued with money from corporate advertising.
“They want to say I, a consummated Virgin, did something.
Now Coca-Cola has dibs on my achievement that is barely standing, A scaffolding of learning that was never filled in,
That I learned from my mother before I was five.”
After fifty years between toil and Divine Rapture, There stood his unfathomable masterpiece
And by the grace of a mad god,
His church stands soundly.

You may ask what is Evil

And look at the monk who set himself on fire
You may think he failed in his training
Old, venerable, with mind stronger than a hundred elephants
Yet he burns, a failure in his training… surely that is Evil

Watch carefully as he burns, he is teaching us something we need to know
He looks at his audience and teaches calmly :
“Don’t let out the fire within, And don’t let in the fire outside”

The fire the monk felt was nothing
Here is the hottest flame. The thoughts that blame, the words that finds fault. The speech that condemns. This poem that looks for Evil, that we set to the flame. Burning, there is a consuming hate.

How I have burned for this world!

Blue Shell

If every rhyme were true,
How blue the sky would be;
How i would know i were me
And not a vessel for a crowd.
“Did you say a cloud?”
“Thats your foggy cochlea speaking.”
“White noise you mean?”
“Like the sound of the ocean,
Caught in our great blue shell.”

Sex and Dearth

When I was young I could be among rocks.
Their mystery was solid,
Forming a hidden creation story.
In the beginning, everything was

In the midsection, indifferent,
Now she is revealed,
Her solidity just another surface.
Oh to be among rocks again.

The Winnower

Winnowing the sand,
The fine ones sail first.
The subtleties do not stay.

A fresh easter wind will have hints,
Meaningless meanings of grass and pine.
To ignore these hints:
Even the wolf or bear does not live so brutally.

An awareness of things light
Keeps my foot off the gas pedal a little more
And saves the waif of an old man
From dying today.

Unseen for his tenuousness,
His mind of such strength
To direct his shaking foot
In front of the other
As he walks transparent in front of my car.

The winnower sifts such minds off the face of the earth By droves every day.

I do not know this presence in my mind
That keeps those on the verge of flight
Alight on this earth,

But it is these men and women
Who keep the winnower
From taking the earth.

Let’s be birds in human bodies

Her mind crawled inside a chrysalis
With her verb nouned
“Let us suppose,” says Socrates to Theatetus, “that the mind is an aviary”
And Timeas offers “Out of the innocent, light-minded”
Those with a clear sky for an aviary
“Transform into birds and grow feathers instead of hair.
And missiles in the air, as they are today,
Bring my sister flutters in her stomach
She says they are real butterflies
And that buzzing could be any electronic, yet for now it is still bees,
They are asking us to suppose Our transmogration
Into a verb.

The Sound of (Light)

The sound of light is heard, not anywhere you can shed light.
Listening hard is not hard, but on hearing the sound of a wildflower seed bursting open in the ground
The pregnant mind did no digging, that would be suicide.
When you ask something hard, and then you listen because the answer is inside
The imprint in the memory of a future ghost of
Recordings of recordings of still warm sounds overlapping: doors creak, giggling footfalls all parenthesized by the sound of
A father become grandfather, fading on the shelf.
The colors remember being bright, that is the sound of light.
A candle lit one after the other, I hear them recalling, farther than
The stars arms can reach, running their fingers over imprints over imprints.
Grandfather is smiling benevolently on grand-not-yet- mothers, grand,
Full with not-yet-dawn.

Where is tomorrow now?

“Tomorrow’s flowers are very weak today”, says the rain
We do one little thing for tomorrow,
without remembering our ancestors
who stole from us the joy of washing clothes by hand.
think this is a small matter?
Some people work all day at a conveyor belt making small motions with their hands.
These people are very useful, and when they are done, they have an energy called merit.
They have blissful sleep, and blissful waking.
No matter how small her movement on the conveyor belt,
how little left, this laundry
Is my laundry, Get out of my way and let me do it,
The proud poet, looking down on this small act of laundry, with an air of “knowing what it means.”
Because we need laundry, both towers of intellect will fall
People will not find ease easy, There is no “how” for ease.
Only a refrain
A mantra that yields merit
A refrain for truth
A refrain for harmlessness A refrain for great sex
A refrain for

Where is tomorrow now?
“Tomorrow’s water is very weak today”, says the rain
Tomorrow is a space we open today: A space we can close,
This tired subject cannot will itself into perfect vacuousness: when space is positively empty.
Oh spacious, generous mind: Refrain, only only a refrain
A refrain for truth
A refrain for harmlessness A refrain for great sex
A refrain for

Oh spacious, generous mind, where is tomorrow now? “Tomorrow is very weak today”

I am the shadow of a diamond

I am the breath of a fish
I am the one you love to hate
I am the master knot
That keeps obsidian from breaking From the aching mind.
I am nothing, really
untie me, I beg you
We can both be free

Red

My wife teaches me the passionate, fiery love
My mentor teaches me to follow this flame
But I chose yellow… yellow…
And my heart, my eyes and my song are green.
What a love triangle I have here.
My wife tells me I drink too much water
Water, to me, is luck… I suck from the bottle
A vile habit
For water
But not for beer, is it wrong?
I love water, and it harms, yes
There is no blameless food… minus air
Even thought drains others:
A wind that obstructs.
If you know how to eat fruit, breathe and keep a blank mind,
You would never have to give a thing to the world, not one bit of work.
It is not selfish, there is no need for trash, no need for babies, no need for conquest
Of abundance.
Are you going to blame the grasshopper for living his life this way?
The consumer philosophy is selfish. working and giving love, believing that justifies spending merit
On stem cells from babies, or a trash-filled ocean. Tearing a new hole in the sky, no…
But I was trying to write a poem about love. And now I think I know what my love is.
Drink Me.

to the goddess

Brilliant, born of someone ignorant, This verse of staggering beauty,
Is so light and enlightening,
You will gasp and drop the book, Expecting it to take to the air,
Or be inspired to take a leap of faith,
A leap of encouragement off a cliff—
Not a minor cliff, a staggering cliff that astounds and dumbfounds, as a true true leap, an honest leap
On to toothy rocks roiling with foam and green shag—
Lightning tears the sky over an unbroken horizon; striking, harming the radiant, primal mind. The god within made jagged.
We dream a fearful prayer as lights’ fingers stretch for us, succumb to the domineering clouds Pressing down over the early light, darkening, as, just as,
Just as the eyes wake, we leap

Never Enough

Are the only words that satisfy the requirement of truth
I read because there is a missing piece
I keep hope that the next word will fill me in. But the missing piece is hope,
And when I remember:
I want these memories, not those memories
But those dark memories weigh more Stop writing about death
And what if
My death does not echo forever What if there is something unfinished
Quick, throw the poem in the shower
Powder it and pinch its cheeks to make it rosy
Spray liberally with Febreeze

Children with a Moon Pie

Walking barefoot to a hot hot festival day,
When you don’t feel the heat because your mother baked a Moon pie
With money to feed us for a week.
We eat it soon, brothers elbowing skin and bones
The festival ahead, the best moment is not eating the pie at the festival
It is just before this moment.

(Untitled)

The poet drowns in a blurred surface
Painted to look like water
The painter has proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that 3/4th of an inch is repugnant to the nature of his bread crumbs.
All he has are crumbs and he feasts on them
Smaller and smaller, emaciated, he can’t find the right amount of blurriness.
He fails because thinks blurriness
is an amount
He read Plato when his bread crumbs were bigger,
How he says likeness and difference are relationships between the same two things
Even though they are opposites
He wants there to be a degree for likeness and difference
So that he can ignore how little sense there is in the world
Therefore, beyond a shadow of a doubt,
He can never finish his painting.
Maybe 1/4 of an inch is a small enough crumb to stop.

Idea Consumer

Its all in the cut
Its all in the invisible
Mark it cut it rip it snatch it
A splash a wave
We touch it and it feels ))) what we feel.
The mind that loves
To read
Don’t let anyone see
How beautiful you are

Vive la Résistance

A cut-throat knew how to follow people So that they didn’t have a clue
Until the cold knife.
I was going up his alley
When I felt something.
Maybe I shouldn’t turn in the square,
Because they will laugh at me, because I am wrong, not confident,
I turn and he is there. He whistles with respect. I know he knows, I knew him, because he knows how to follow people.
This life, an abundance of war,
but the war is on the air.
Men who fight the air are fools, they can only occupy, And those who occupy are mortal.
The soldiers should carry sunflower seeds
To grow on their corpses.
They occupy me because
Because I am a push-over, Nothing, like power, only shadows,
Soldiers may pound the air forever and
Call the air names, like pussy
(and while you are acting, don’t forget to breathe) I know them when they enter me
give the air
A form,
wishing there was no limitless sky, no formless thought
Formless is union
Emptiness is union
These contemplations are better than sex.
We are pushed to humanize the soldier
Because that is double thinking. The soldier kills, he enters and occupies The soldier fights because he is angry
at his mortality,
boasting because he is weak.
Dig deep for your sex, they say Until they have lost the light And they are in the Underworld.
How light is heaven, how invisible, easy breezy beautiful Cover Girl How anger, acting fails to touch
the untouchable face

A Child who
Plays with Nothing
Plays with Creation.

Broken Home

Rags are indecent, and there is no shame in covering with what you have. Maybe it is mean for the beggar to beg, as a poet begs for his words, and a man begs for a bride. A woman will say no to the haggard emaciated beggars: Those hanging around the temple of the Green Buddha hoping for a hand out. The Green Buddha, who all clamber to, offering food and a home. Yet He will not eat except what will stave off death for a day, and even in the temple given to him, he knows his homelessness. The beggars, his disciples, where is the difference? Because everyone will learn. And who will be His bride? We are all Buddhas, you would know it if you would let the prophets speak. The ladles of immortality that the House of the West offer are empty. We clothe ourselves in fine ideas that are transparent, and the finer our idea, the more naked and indecent we are. The Emperor has no clothes, and has many women. Get down on your knees and believe: There is one and only one woven cloth with which all the worlds of dreams and hardships, queens and beggars clothe themselves. Only this cloth is real, we try to fill it, but in the end we must give the cloth away.

let it be known

let it be known, Anonymously
That there is a grand pronouncement that must be made: “Words are hotter than flame”
But if there is too much fire,
You end up with nothing.
I write words, and say sweet nothings
But people stop believing me
Not because I am a liar, I am the Liar of liars…. But because the beautiful, ever renewing truth Warm, overflowing, understanding
Is tiresome.
A murder and a dead body dissolved in powerful acid Is a riveting vision, brought by words,
That can only really burn you
When you are already on fire
But maybe didn’t notice
And I can say that it is warm, that it gives light But there is too much fire
And my words burned into emptiness.

Put your ear to the earth

Many low firefighters don’t see into shadows
They think knowledge of the underworld, known by the high and mighty sages, is not necessary to know.
Yet firefighters will hear
vibrations growing louder and louder in an ear full of positive thinking.
A sponge is a simple being,
A being I can empathize with,
who suffers in a world where we have all become firefighters,
I see the desperation in the positive thinker,
positive like the sun, a distant fire, called closer and closer
by those who run away from their own pain,
And so I run with trains and cars, bikes and planes, I run with body, but with mind
I face the fire and speak of its immanence.
I am a bad Buddhist because I weep for the earth, weep as she weeps,
Unabashedly,
with all strength.
Take up the Mother’s cry!

The silver lining while floating on the edge of the abyss.

If you’ll allow a moment of pause while reading these words..

I had a teacher who played a math game with me.

I would give him a math problem, and he would leave me alone

Until he solved it, then our roles exchanged.

I never spent a waking hour solving his problems

Because I would solve them in my sleep.

I do a tremendous amount of work in my sleep.

I didn’t realize how important it was that I always slept in

And missed my morning calculus class.

As you can predict, it became a waste of time to sleep.

And worst of all, it wasn’t my time I was wasting.

Awi

The bird on the wall
Sings a song that speaks light
A litany of souls
A-O-U-I-E
the 5 dragons, 5 elements,
The 9 legends and the 108 heroes and
heroines
They keep changing the chemical name, so they slip through the cracks of the law
And that way we can still get high
They call me Ghostname
Little did I know I was the
nameless nameless one
The residue left by Name and Form
Integrable Almost Everywhere
you sweep the floor and get a few particles of dust we like to call points that amount to nothing
You go to throw them away, but the dust pan is empty like your face
In the rain
beauty has all five vowel sounds too
the cracks between
the seven colors in the rainbow are uncountable
Like counting the waves, there is always one more, like this,
don’t look for me
The sad clown in the corner of your eye

On Complexity

There are very complex theories. A computer operating system is one of the most complex creations, with more moving parts than a commercial airplane. Airplanes fly, thats nice, but operating systems do something harder: they engage the human mind in every way. There are operating systems for household chores, entertainment, most kinds of work, and social existence. If there were a place for complexity, the internet and its administration would be this place, or non- place. Complexity is what protects our privacy… whats left of it.. in the form of encryption. In this case, and many others, complexity is there almost for its own sake. It is a gatekeeper. The complexity of encryption is not related to the privacy of our homemade pornography starring “me”. Encryption is dark for the sake of being dark. We need this darkness to make fools of ourselves in private. Computers are just embodied mathematics, after all, and mathematics has become the gatekeeper for most things. Science is one of few generalities that claim mathematics is not for its own sake as a gatekeeper. Most importantly, the complexity of mathematics in Science is both the gate and the reality. The reality in our minds: the conversion of ideas to things, and things to ideas. Mathematics is the night sky, the simple darkness in which the universe can play out its complexities. It is at once the mountain one must climb to reach the sky, and the sky itself. The arid peak, from which the world is a map, and new stars can be contemplated. The point of dependence of sky on land, and of land on sky. The recognition of complexity is a simple recognition.

Vagueness is Essential

Vagueness is not a matter of semantics. It is a problem that troubles the basic assertion that, as our old friend Berty Russell asserted as an axiom in the Principlia Mathematica, “Everything that is, is.” The basics are a very interesting place to stay. We would like to say this is a basic and acceptable assertion, and it turns out to not be basic at all. In fact, no subject is elementary, and also every subject is elementary.

Channell and Rowland argue that vagueness has pragmatic usefulness: “For language to be fully useful, therefore, in the sense of being able to describe all of human beings’ experience, it must incorporate built-in flexibility. This flexibility resides, in part, in its capacity for vagueness” (p201 Channell 1994) Dr. Channell outlines various views of where vagueness comes from, from the difference between the “same idea” in different minds (Fodor 1977 in Channell 1994), to language (Peirce 1902 in Channell 1994), to physical reality (Russell 1923). Vagueness is found discussed in logic (Lakoff 1972 in Channell 1994) where it is argued (along with Russell) that “true” and “false” are vague, and so classical logic could be modified…” (p66 Nightingale 2019)

“[i]t is perfectly obvious, since colours form a continuum, that there are shades of colour concerning which we shall be in doubt whether to call them red or not, not because we are ignorant of the meaning of the word “red,” but because it is a word the extent of whose application is essentially doubtful.” (1923 Russell as quoted in Nightingale 2019, p66).

“The word “red” is vague in this respect because there are borderline cases where it is not clear whether or not we should call the case “red”. Russell says “essentially doubtful” because this uncertainty is essential, in the sense of being a part of the nature of red. One deception here is in asserting that the “continuum” is a perfectly precise reality that can be expressed numerically. This renders vagueness a kind of error; without a perfectly known continuum underneath our words, vagueness is not error but has a reality of its own. Does the continuum suffer from vagueness?…

Peirce claimed that another way to describe generality is where the Law of Excluded Middle (“A or ~A is always true”) does not hold. This makes sense because normally, the LEM decides which of “A or ~A” is true (even if we don’t know which is decided, it asserts that “out there” it is decided.) When the LEM does not apply “A or ~A” is left undecided, which allows for a generalization on “A or ~A”, you can choose which. However the claim that something can be essentially uncertain is directly against the LEM.” (p66-68 Nightingale 2019)

I mean to say that reifying vagueness proves the LEM is false, in general. (The ideas of general and of vague are intimately connected) Russell asserted “everything that is, is” in order to “prove” the LEM. And here I am arguing against the LEM, which would also be against “everything that is, is” What makes red red? In this question i mean to be vague between term red and the actual red. If everything that is depends on other things to be, there is a certain spaciousness to Being, an undefined vagueness between Being and Space.

new research on vagueness and logical negations

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My work starts from a simple but demanding idea: vagueness is not a mere defect of language but the embodied boundary where inquiry meets the world. When our concepts strain against experience, the right response is often not to force a sharp verdict but to hold a statement open—to let the question live—while we continue to investigate.

The two following papers on negation are the technical head of this programme: they show, in detail, how the absence of a privileged resolution and the presence of schematic plurality force us to rethink what it is for negation and consequence to be “fixed,” and how truth can depend on the very indeterminacy that inquiry reveals.

On this picture:

  • There is no final “master logic” or completed, gapless continuum that captures all motion, concept‑use, or meaning once and for all.
  • Questions, potential, and indeterminacy are structural features of our engagement with the world, not noise to be eliminated.
  • Poetry and pedagogy are not merely illustrative; they are among the primary places where vagueness and pluralism are lived and can be studied with the same seriousness as formal systems.

Taken together, these claims support a picture in which logic, mathematics, and language are continuous with lived inquiry and poetry, not insulated from them. The same phenomena that appear in stories, metaphors, and classroom experiments—borderline cases, unresolved questions, plural paths—reappear in the formal study of negation, consequence, and completeness.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/411137932_No_Privileged_Resolution_Ambiguity_vagueness_and_the_individuation_of_negation

This paper argues that some cases of semantic individuation cannot be cleanly classified as either ambiguous or vague. The central claim is conditional: if no resolution of a term’s candidate readings is privileged, and if refinement of those readings never terminates, then the classication of the term as ambiguous rather than vague never completes, and no verdict is
stable. Applied to negation, the consequence is that a stock of negations that remains sharp at every resolution but keeps refining without terminating is not well captured by the received ambiguity/vagueness taxonomy. The paper defends this claim by combining a philosophical argument from resolution-dependence with a formal model of endlessly refinable readings.
The load-bearing premise is metaphysical: the absence of a privileged resolution is the absence of a fact, not merely of a reason, and the paper identifies the principal deniers of that premise the semantic epistemicist, who posits an unknowable fact of individuation, and the logical monist, for whom abduction or joint-carving selects a uniquely correct framework. The paper also answers the reflexive worry that its own assertions fall to its own thesis: because every admissible negation is classical on the classical values, the paper’s metalinguistic claims are fixed points of the variation the thesis describes.

“Preprint version, not peer‑reviewed. I am continuing background reading on related work in philosophy of logic, and the arguments may be revised in light of further research.”

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/411137931_Pairing_Indeterminacy_in_a_Schematic_Theory_of_Negation

This paper defends two connected claims. First, in a schematic theory with two negation indices and no index-specific semantic or metasemantic fixing facts, there is no fact of the matter as to which index denotes which negation. The relata are determinate; the pairing is not. Second, for a suitable witness sentence with middle value, the truth-status of a mixed formula built from those negations depends on that pairing-indeterminacy rather than standing independently of it. The order of explanation matters: individuation comes first, truth-indeterminacy second.

The paper also clarifies a potential misdescription of the result. The view defended is not that no disambiguation is possible in every setting whatsoever. It is the conditional thesis that, within a genuinely schematic theory that excludes index-specific semantic stipulation and metasemantic use-facts, no privileged pairing is fixed. Under those conditions, the standard permutation argument goes through. This conditional result is philosophically substantive because logical vocabulary is often thought to have its meaning fixed by role alone. The schematic condition (S) is not an artificial vacuum: it formalizes the situation that logical pluralists explicitly assert and that inferentialists implicitly presuppose, so the conditional result binds both camps. A further dichotomy sharpens the antecedent: constraints that treat the indices alike can narrow the stock of admissible negations, but they cannot select within a symmetric orbit, so every index-neutral resource either leaves the indeterminacy in place or dissolves the plurality on which it feeds. Even the dissolving cases are frame-relative: the excluded-middle rule that collapses the stock under one designation and disjunction preserves plurality under neighboring settings, so which horn of the dichotomy a constraint occupies is itself a resolution-dependent matter.