Vagueness is not a matter of semantics. It is a problem that troubles the basic assertion that, as our old friend Berty Russell asserted as an axiom in the Principlia Mathematica, "Everything that is, is." The basics are a very interesting place to stay. We would like to say this is a basic and acceptable assertion, and it turns out to not be basic at all. In fact, no subject is elementary, and also every subject is elementary. 
 
Channell and Rowland argue that vagueness has pragmatic usefulness: "For language to be fully useful, therefore, in the sense of being able to describe all of human beings' experience, it must incorporate built-in flexibility. This flexibility resides, in part, in its capacity for vagueness" (p201 Channell 1994) Dr. Channell outlines various views of where vagueness comes from, from the difference between the "same idea" in different minds (Fodor 1977 in Channell 1994), to language (Peirce 1902 in Channell 1994), to physical reality (Russell 1923). Vagueness is found discussed in logic (Lakoff 1972 in Channell 1994) where it is argued (along with Russell) that "true" and "false" are vague, and so classical logic could be modified..." (p66 Nightingale 2019) 

"[i]t is perfectly obvious, since colours form a continuum, that there are shades of colour concerning which we shall be in doubt whether to call them red or not, not because we are ignorant of the meaning of the word "red," but because it is a word the extent of whose application is essentially doubtful." (1923 Russell as quoted in Nightingale 2019, p66). 

"The word "red" is vague in this respect because there are borderline cases where it is not clear whether or not we should call the case "red". Russell says "essentially doubtful" because this uncertainty is essential, in the sense of being a part of the nature of red. One deception here is in asserting that the "continuum" is a perfectly precise reality that can be expressed numerically. This renders vagueness a kind of error; without a perfectly known continuum underneath our words, vagueness is not error but has a reality of its own. Does the continuum suffer from vagueness?...
Peirce claimed that another way to describe generality is where the Law of Excluded Middle ("A or ~A is always true") does not hold. This makes sense because normally, the LEM decides which of "A or ~A" is true (even if we don't know which is decided, it asserts that "out there" it is decided.) When the LEM does not apply "A or ~A" is left undecided, which allows for a generalization on "A or ~A", you can choose which. However the claim that something can be essentially uncertain is directly against the LEM." (p66-68 Nightingale 2019)

I mean to say that reifying vagueness proves the LEM is false, in general. (The ideas of general and of vague are intimately connected) Russell asserted "everything that is, is" in order to "prove" the LEM. And here I am arguing against the LEM, which would also be against "everything that is, is" What makes red red? In this question i mean to be vague between term red and the actual red. If everything that is depends on other things to be, there is a certain spaciousness to Being, an undefined vagueness between Being and Space.